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Economic Rehabilitation: Understanding the Growth in Consumer Proposals  
under Canadian Insolvency Legislation 
 
Dr. Janis Sarra1 
 
Abstract 
 
Economic rehabilitation is the notion underlying Canada’s Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA), 
providing consumer debtors with an opportunity for a “fresh start” through the mechanism of 
bankruptcy or making a proposal to their creditors for payment of their debts on terms that allow 
them to rehabilitate their financial status. This article undertakes a comparison of consumer 
proposals and consumer bankruptcies, examining 5,773 individual insolvencies in the past two 
years, with a view to discerning choices by individual insolvent debtors of insolvency proceeding.  
It compares causes of financial distress, income levels, quantum of debt and the assets of those 
filing proposals or bankruptcies. The data indicate that overextension of credit is a primary cause 
of insolvency, being 20% to 24% the primary cause across all cohorts.  Home mortgage liability is 
significant for the Division I proposal debtors, but less significant for bankrupts, many of whom do 
not have equity in homes.  Credit card debt is a serious problem across all groups. Credit card 
debt, unlike fixed loans such as mortgages, can quickly escalate, is owed at much higher interest 
rates that can rapidly compound financial distress, and the lack of a defined payment plan, other 
than a minimum payment, means that consumer debtors are not encouraged to pay these debts 
first, leading to longer term financial distress. Yet, to date, insolvency policy does not really factor 
the nature of this debt into policy development.  Job loss and seasonal employment together are 
a significant cause of insolvency across Division II consumer proposal debtors (26%), Division II 
business proposal debtors (33%), and bankrupts (28%), but less so for Division I proposal 
debtors (16%). These data suggest that there are broader economic and social challenges that 
need to be addressed, as financial distress is often beyond the control of the individual debtor.  
To date, there is little linkage in Canada between economic stimulus and employment policy 
development and insolvency law policy development. Medical reasons are also a significant 
cause for Division II business proposal debtors (15%) and bankruptcy (11%), compared with the 
other cohorts. However, it is uncertain whether medical bills and lack of coverage, or medical 
problems resulting in inability to earn sufficient income are the real source of the financial 
distress. Equally, medical debt may be masked if consumer debtors have paid for medical bills by 
credit card on exit from hospital or particular outpatient services, as is the normal practice in 
some regions.  The study offers both observations on the data and recommendations for future 
research and policy development. 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Economic rehabilitation is the notion underlying Canada’s bankruptcy and insolvency system.  As 
with many jurisdictions, the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) provides consumer debtors with 
an opportunity for a “fresh start” through the mechanism of bankruptcy or through the mechanism 
of making a proposal to their creditors for payment of their debts, but on terms that allow them to 
rehabilitate their financial status.2  This paper examines the insolvency of individuals in Canada; 
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specifically, it undertakes a comparison of consumer proposals and consumer bankruptcies under 
the BIA.   
 
There has been an increase in the number of consumer proposals in recent years, with little 
public understanding of what may be driving the shift from bankruptcy to proposals. The 1997 
amendments to the BIA were aimed in part at encouraging proposals as an alternative 
mechanism for individual debtors to address their financial distress.  While the number of 
proposals filed has increased, the number of failed proposals has also increased; yet the failure 
rate has not resulted in a lessening of the numbers filed. The reasons underlying this trend are 
not immediately evident.  It could be the greater facility with which proposals can be filed.  There 
has also been some speculation that the high costs of trustee fees, surplus income payments 
and/or other recent policy measures have driven the change.  This research project sought to 
establish an empirical basis for the growth in filing of proposal proceedings, including an 
investigation of what factors are drivers in the shift to proposals and what may serve as a 
deterrent to this option.  The objective was to try to discern the impact of particular policy choices 
on consumers’ decisions to undertake a proposal instead of bankruptcy as the resolution to their 
financial distress. 
 
This study undertakes an analysis of 5,773 individual insolvencies in the past two years, with a 
view to discerning choices by individual insolvent debtors of insolvency proceeding.  It undertakes 
a comparison of the causes of financial distress and income levels of debtors filing proposals in 
comparison with a representative sample of consumer bankrupts, to determine whether the cause 
of financial distress is a determinant of choice of proceeding. The study also examines the type 
and quantum of debt and the assets of those filing proposals or bankruptcies, in order to discern 
patterns in consumer financial distress.  One working hypothesis of the study was that consumers 
that have assets to protect, particularly family homes, are more likely to opt for a proposal, in 
order to try to protect those assets from seizure and liquidation. The paper explores whether the 
policy choices in Canada offer effective options for consumer debtors at a time of particular 
vulnerability. The project was funded with the support of the Research Initiative of the Canadian 
Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy (OSB).   
 
It merits note at the outset that there is an indeterminate number of consumer debtors in Canada 
that do not access formal insolvency proceedings at all.  The data on these individuals are almost 
non-existent in Canada, and they are not included in this study.  However, it is important to be 
mindful of the fact that there may be significant market and regulatory reasons that drive 
financially distressed consumer debtors to opt for neither a bankruptcy application nor a proposal. 
This group of debtors requires further scholarly research and public policy consideration. 
 
Part II of this paper explains the methodology of the study, including the limitations of such data 
analysis. Part III sets a context for the study.  Part IV sets out the legislative framework, providing 
a brief overview of the options for economic rehabilitation for consumer debtors, including 
Division II consumer proposals, Division I proposals and bankruptcy.3   Part V examines the 
primary causes of insolvency and provides a summary analysis of the types of debts and assets 
that consumer debtors bring to the proceeding.  Part VI looks briefly at prior bankruptcies and 
proposals.  Part VII examines potential points of failure of proposals and Part VIII looks at the 
type and amount of recoveries under different proceedings. Part IX concludes by summarizing 
research questions and making observations about the choice of proceedings by consumer 
debtors.  The findings may offer a baseline of information that could be utilized for comparative 
purposes in a few years, in order to assess insolvency trends such as whether the nature of 
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financial distress for consumer debtors is deepening with time, whether income profiles, causes 
of insolvency are changing or are factors driving choice of proceeding. 
 
 
II. Methodological Approach 
 
The study concentrated on consumer debtors 2005-2007, examining 5,773 individual 
insolvencies in depth. The study examined 2,967 consumer debtors that filed Division II 
proposals; 1,063 Division II business proposals involving sole proprietors/individuals; 743 Division 
I proposals made by insolvent consumer debtors; and 1,000 consumer bankruptcy files. 
 
A literature search was conducted at the outset, in order to identify the issues relevant to 
consumer financial distress and to ascertain the scope of empirical data that exists in other 
jurisdictions.  While empirical scholarship on consumer debtors continues to be limited in Canada, 
there is a rich body of literature in the United States (US), in particular, that of the scholars 
involved with the Consumer Bankruptcy Project, a large-scale longitudinal research program 
initiated in 1981 by scholars Teresa Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren and Jay Westbrook and involving 
a number of scholars from multiple disciplines over the past 25 years, which has examined 
bankrupt households on a national basis.4  The literature was examined to assist with identifying 
research questions and data that should be examined. Future work will hopefully compare the 
Canadian and U.S. findings. 
 
The first part of the study involved design of research fields for retrieval of electronic records, 
working with staff and economists at the OSB.  The data was generated by region across Canada 
to be representative of the breakdown of persons filing in various regions, in proportion to 
numbers filed, size of estates and type of file, in order to create an accurate representative 
sample.  
 
The study then analyzed the cases to determine the causes of insolvency.  One problem that 
currently exists with the electronic data is that there are not separately captured fields for cause 
of insolvency.  Hence, the data on causes had to be manually pulled from the files; assessed in 
terms of the primary cause of insolvency, self-declared with the assistance of the trustee or 
administrator; and then entered into an Excel database.  This task was very labour intensive, 
undertaken by UBC law students. Protocols for inputting data and a methodology for analyzing 
the data were developed, coding variables within cases on a consistent basis so that 
comparisons could be generated across region and cohort.  The author undertook a random 
second-check on 300 files to verify consistency in the inputting of data.  
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 4 
One limitation to analyzing these data was that there were instances in which bankrupts listed 
more than one cause of bankruptcy, for example, job loss combined with over-extension of credit.  
For purposes of examining the files, we took the declared primary and secondary causes, but it is 
important to note that there are frequently synergistic contributions to financial distress that are 
not captured when reporting global statistics.   
 
The next stage was to analyze the full data set of 5,773 files by retrieving data and undertaking 
analysis of the data by region, type and quantum of debt and assets, dividends received by 
creditors, and other reported information.5 Income to debt analysis would have been helpful, but 
there was inadequate data available on income of the consumer debtors studied.  The data that 
were available allowed for global analysis of the files across different cohorts, as discussed later 
in this paper.  While the data set was relatively complete, there were files in which fields had not 
been completed with information.6 The data were generated through the OSB’s database; hence 
a real strength of the study is the quality and reliability of the data on which various policy options 
can be explored. The OSB’s move to e-filing and the collection of data have been extremely 
important initiatives for both government policy makers and scholars, in that it offers the 
opportunity to examine empirically what is occurring in the field.  The information generated by 
study of the OSB data was supplemented by information gathering from a sample group of ten 
trustees in the insolvency professional community, who work on a daily basis with consumer 
debtors and with the existing legislation.  
 
A limitation of the study is that it did not seek the direct input of consumer debtors through survey 
or other means.  As discovered in a previous empirical study of elderly debtors under the OSB’s 
research initiative, it is difficult to directly canvass consumer debtors, given their vulnerability, fear 
of public exposure and current university ethics standards for contact with vulnerable study 
populations.7  However, as noted by scholars associated with the US Consumer Bankruptcy 
Project, direct interviewing and surveying considerably enhances the quantity and quality of 
information regarding consumer debtors and should be a future research priority in Canada.8  
 
There were a number of research questions that the project sought to answer.  First, was whether 
the causes of financial distress are a determinant of choice of proposal or bankruptcy.  Second, 
what factors drive the filing of a Division I proposal, as opposed to a Division II consumer 
proposal? Third, what impact does the different timing period for rehabilitating one’s credit rating 
have on the decision to make a proposal or not; and how does the availability of automatic 
discharge influence the choice to opt for bankruptcy?  Are current surplus income requirements 
creating normative pressure to select a particular proceeding? Has the trustee’s obligation to 
make a report that, in its view, the debtor was in a position to make a proposal had an impact on 
the type of filing? Will current proposed amendments encourage more debtors to undertake 
proposals? Only some of these questions were possible to answer with the nature and type of 
data available.  
 
 
III. Context for the Study 
 
In Canada, there has been a steady growth in consumer insolvency since the early 1970s. During 
the 1980s and 1990s, the average annual growth of consumer insolvency in Canada was 
approximately 7.5%. However, since 2000, the rate has slowed to an average annual rate of 
growth 1.9%. In 2006, the rate of consumer insolvency decreased for the first time by 4.1%, but 
continues to remain substantially higher than 25 years ago.  There are no data available for why 
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the rate slowed in the past two years.  It could be as a result of better economic conditions, lower 
unemployment and higher GDP.  However, it could also be as a result of individual debtors 
waiting longer to file insolvency proceedings.  In the U.S., Ronald Mann has suggested that 
financially troubled consumer debtors are delaying filing bankruptcy, what he has called the 
“sweat-box” theory of consumer lending, whereby credit card lenders encourage debtors to 
continue making payments on their high interest credit cards for a few months longer before they 
file, contributing to the lenders’ profits, but exacerbating the amount of debt of debtors by the time 
they file, placing them in deeper debt and thus at risk of losing more of their assets to satisfy 
creditors’ claims.9 Absent longitudinal data in Canada, one cannot determine if the same trend is 
occurring in this country.  
 
In 1980, the rate of insolvency was 1.1 per thousand Canadians; by 2006, it was 3.8 per 
thousand, more than three times the 1980 rate.10  To place this rate in context, the rate in the US 
was 7.0 insolvencies per thousand people in 2004; in the United Kingdom, 1.1 in 2004 and in 
Australia, 1.6 per thousand.11  Hence, while Canada’s rate is considerably lower than in the US, it 
is several times greater than the UK and Australia.  
 
In 2007, there were a total of 108,830 bankruptcies and proposals in Canada.12 Of these files, 
79,796 or 73% were consumer bankruptcies.13  6,307 were business bankruptcies, which 
includes corporate and non-corporate businesses.14  
 
As an alternative to bankruptcy, the BIA allows consumers and businesses to make a proposal, 
which is an arrangement with creditors for a compromise of liabilities, a revised schedule for 
payment or other arrangement that allows the debtor to work out its financial distress.  The BIA 
proposal proceedings are used for individuals and for all sizes of business, from sole 
proprietorships to larger corporations, although this study examines only individual insolvency.  
Proposals can be made under the Division II consumer proposals provisions or under the Division 
I proposal provisions of the BIA. In 2007, there were 22,727 proposals filed, of which 3,241 were 
business proposals and 19,486 were consumer proposals.15  
 
Another reason for undertaking this study was the growth in credit card debt in Canada and the 
need to consider the impact of that growth. Credit card debt has become a major contributing 
factor to the amount of debt carried by consumers, in some cases leading to insolvency. Given 
the high interest rates on credit cards, consumer debtors that do not have an income stream to 
cover the minimum payment are more likely to default on the credit card payments.  Bankruptcy 
becomes a means of relieving the financial distress and having a “fresh start” in terms of the 
credit card debt.  Ronald Mann has observed that to the extent that credit cards have facilitated 
entrepreneurial activity and consumer borrowing, they have been an important component of a 
modern economy, but that there are social costs associated with credit cards, in the form of 
financial distress and an increase in consumer bankruptcy. 16  He observes that excessive credit 
card debt can impose substantial costs on the debtor, family members and the general welfare 
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safety net; as well as cost consequences from the diminished productive activities of those 
individuals in financial distress.17  
 
The pattern of consumer insolvency in Canada matches somewhat the pattern in the US, at least 
prior to the most recent round of legislative reform in the US. Essentially, increased numbers of 
consumer debtors are experiencing financial distress, from all levels of the social strata and from 
diverse regions.18  Over-extension of credit appears to be a primary driving cause.19 
 
Professors Warren, Westbrook and Sullivan, in their empirical study of consumer insolvencies in 
the US, report that consumer debtors filing for bankruptcy in the US have substantially larger debt 
loads than in the previous years; and median total debt loads in 2001 were up 55.9 percent from 
1981 in inflation adjusted dollars.20 Their data found that mean debt loads climbed tremendously 
between 1991 and 2001, in particular, home mortgages and payday loans. They observe that 
higher secured debt loads are consistent with greater assets and an increase in the number of 
homeowners since 1991, but also a consistent rise in unsecured debt over a twenty year period.  
Warren, Westbrook and Sullivan found that bankrupts had a very high degree of credit on an 
unsecured basis, a finding reinforced by the data in this study on Canada.21 Mean unsecured 
debt in the US increased 48.9 percent from 1981 to 2001.22  
 
Iain Ramsay has noted that in the US, there is substantial overlap of consumer and business 
debt, with many business debtors reporting a combination of business and personal reasons as 
triggers for their bankruptcy filings.23  The data here also suggest a similar comingling of personal 
and business debt. This comingling of debt may help to explain the number of “business 
proposals” under the Division II consumer debtor proposal provisions under the BIA, as discussed 
below in Part V.   
 
The rise in consumer debt in Canada is in part attributable to the growth in the alternative 
financial services market, the most well known of these services being pay day loans.  While 
there has not yet been sufficient study of the effects of these services, Ruth Berry and Karen 
Duncan report that more than 350,000 Canadians use pay day loans each year, and that while 
costs of a first pay day loan may be 20% interest over two weeks, typically the loans are 
repeatedly rolled over with increased fees and service charges.24  Another study indicates that on 
average, pay day lenders provide 15 rollover loans for every first time pay day loan extended.25 
Berry and Duncan found that in 2006, 25% of insolvent consumer debtors owed more than 25% 
of their monthly income to payday lenders.26 This figure is incredibly high and may explain some 
                                                 
17
 Ibid. at 49-50. 
18
 Karen Gross, Failure and Forgiveness: Rebalancing the Bankruptcy System (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1997). 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 Warren, Elizabeth, Westbrook, Jay Lawrence and Sullivan, Teresa A., "Less Stigma or More Financial 
Distress: An Empirical Analysis of the Extraordinary Increase in Bankruptcy Filings" (May 2006) (‘Less 
Stigma”); available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=903355 at 13. Warren, Elizabeth and Westbrook, Jay 
Lawrence, "Financial Characteristics of Businesses in Bankruptcy" (January 2000). American Bankruptcy 
Law Journal Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=194750 or DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.194750 
21
 Warren et al, Less Stigma, ibid. 
22
 Ibid. 
23
 Iain Ramsay, "Comparative Consumer Bankruptcy" . University of Illinois Law Review, p. 241, 2007 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=958190. Iain Ramsay conducted a five-year empirical study of 
about 3,200 business cases originally filed in Chapter 7, Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 in 23 judicial districts 
during 1994, including both small and large businesses. 
24
 Ruth Berry and Karen Duncan, “The Importance of Pay Day Loans in Canadian Consumer Insolvency, 
2008 (on file with the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy). 
25
 Ernst & Young, “The Cost of Providing Payday Loans in Canada” (2006) http://www.cpla-
acps.ca/english/reports/EYPaydayLoanReport.pdf.  
26
 Ibid. at 11. 
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of the reason that consumer debtors file in Canada, although, as will be seen below, the amount 
of pay day debt is still not transparent, as it gets recorded across different categories of debt.   
 
A canvass of the extensive literature on consumer insolvency is beyond the scope of this study; 
however, the scholarship does assist in framing some of the research questions posed here and 
does highlight the need for much further research into the nature of consumer financial distress 
and potential policy options. 
 
 
IV. The Legislative Framework 
 
It is helpful to commence with a very brief overview of the types of remedies available to 
individuals under the BIA when they are insolvent; specifically, bankruptcy, Division I and Division 
II proposals.27   
 
1. Bankruptcy 
 
An insolvent individual can make an assignment in bankruptcy or creditors can file an application 
for a bankruptcy order in respect of the individual.28  In Canada, such bankruptcies are generally 
referred to as personal bankruptcy or consumer bankruptcy, and these terms are used 
interchangeably in this paper.  By section 43(1) of the BIA, a creditor may file an application for a 
bankruptcy order against a debtor, defined as an insolvent person, who, at the time an act of 
bankruptcy was committed by him or her, resided or carried on business in Canada.  
 
The BIA defines insolvent person in section 2(1) for purposes of access to the statute: 
 
2(1)  … "insolvent person" means a person who is not bankrupt and who 
resides, carries on business or has property in Canada, whose liabilities to 
creditors provable as claims under this Act amount to one thousand dollars, 
and  
(a) who is for any reason unable to meet his obligations as they generally  
     become due, 
(b) who has ceased paying his current obligations in the ordinary course of  
     business as they generally become due, or 
(c) the aggregate of whose property is not, at a fair valuation, sufficient, or,       
     if disposed of at a fairly conducted sale under legal process, would not  
     be sufficient to enable payment of all his obligations, due and accruing          
     due. 
 
The BIA sets out ten acts of bankruptcy, the most commonly used one being that the insolvent 
person has ceased to meet liabilities as they generally become due.29  The act of bankruptcy 
must have occurred within six months preceding the filing of the application for a bankruptcy 
order. 
 
When a debtor is insolvent and seeking access to the BIA, a trustee in bankruptcy reviews the 
debtor’s financial situation, explains the various options available, and determines whether any 
surplus income payments are required. All insolvent individuals are required to take counselling 
on money management, warning signs of financial difficulties, and obtaining and using credit, as 
well as counselling advice on creating a financial plan of action.  
                                                 
27
 There are alternatives to proceedings under the BIA; however, such options are beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
28
 For an explanation of the provisions, see L. Houlden, G. Morawetz and J. Sarra, The 2008 Annotated 
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (Toronto: Carswell, 2007), Part II, Bankruptcy Orders and Assignments, at 
130-201. 
29
 BIA, s. 42(1).  
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Automatic discharge is available for first-time bankrupts nine months after they make an 
assignment or are ordered into bankruptcy, unless the trustee recommends a discharge with 
conditions or it is opposed by a creditor, the trustee, or the Superintendent of Bankruptcy.  The 
BIA sets out fifteen facts for which discharge may be refused, suspended or granted conditionally, 
including that the assets of the bankrupt are not of a value equal to fifty cents on the dollar on the 
amount of the bankrupt’s unsecured liabilities, unless the bankrupt can satisfy the court that this 
situation has arisen from circumstances for which the bankrupt cannot justly be held responsible; 
the bankrupt has continued to trade after becoming aware of being insolvent; the bankrupt has 
failed to account satisfactorily for any loss of assets; and the bankrupt has contributed to the 
bankruptcy by rash  and hazardous speculations, by unjustifiable extravagance in living, by 
gambling or by culpable neglect of the bankrupt’s business affairs.30   A conditional discharge 
may also be imposed where the bankrupt did not pay the agreed amount of surplus income, or 
the bankrupt filed for bankruptcy instead of proposing a viable proposal.   
 
For second time bankrupts or those who do not qualify for an automatic discharge, the trustee is 
required within one year from the beginning of the bankruptcy to apply to the court for a hearing 
of the application for a discharge.31 The court can order an absolute, conditional or suspended 
discharge, the latter requiring particular conditions be satisfied before the discharge is final.   
 
The effect of bankruptcy is a “fresh start” financially.  The bankrupt is released of most debts; 
however, specified debts are not released, for example, an award for damages in respect of an 
assault, spousal or child support, a debt arising out of fraud, any court fine, and debts for student 
loans when the bankruptcy occurs while the debtor is still a student or within ten years after the 
bankrupt has ceased to be a student.32  The fresh start framework of bankruptcy under the BIA 
allows the bankrupt to begin to rebuild his or her credit rating and affords the bankrupt relief from 
the crushing burden of debt. 
 
As noted in the introduction, an alternative to bankruptcy for the insolvent individual is a proposal 
under the BIA. There were 18,080 proposal estates closed in 2007, with assets valued at 
1,761,978,535 CAD and liabilities of 3,254,998,920 CAD.  Of those estates, the trustees realized 
932,157,479 CAD and dividends that were paid to creditors totalled 707,428,734 CAD.33 Hence, 
under BIA proposals, creditors realized 21.7% of the claims outstanding against the debtor. This 
amount is considerably higher than what creditors, particularly unsecured creditors, can expect to 
receive in bankruptcy.  There are two kinds of proposals, Division I and Division II. 
 
 
2. Division II Proposals 
 
Proposal is defined in the BIA as including a proposal for a composition, where creditors agree to 
accept less than full repayment or an extension of time; and/or a scheme of arrangement in terms 
of alteration of debt and equity structure.34   
 
Under both Division II and Division I proposals, there is an initial automatic stay on creditors 
moving to enforce any of their claims for a thirty day period, which gives the insolvent debtor a 
chance to negotiate with creditors for a possible proposal and going-forward plan to address the 
insolvency. A trustee or administrator assists with development of the proposal, and acts in a 
monitoring and advisory capacity.  
 
                                                 
30
 BIA, s. 173(1). 
31
 When the recent amendments to the BIA come into force, there will be the availability of automatic 
discharge for second time bankrupts. 
32
 BIA, s. 178(1). 
33
 Administration costs for proposals totalled 224,728,745 CAD in 2006. 
34
 BIA, section 2(1). 
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Division II consumer proposals are available to insolvent individuals whose debts are less than 
75,000 CAD, excluding a mortgage on the individual’s principal residence.35  The provisions were 
enacted as a mechanism to deal with smaller estates on a more cost-effective and expedited 
basis. The number of consumer proposals has been growing since the introduction of Division II 
consumer proposals in 1993.36 In 2006, more than 19,200 consumer proposals were filed, as 
opposed to 2,200 in 1993. Hence, 19.5% of consumer insolvency files were proposal proceedings 
in 2006, compared with only 3.8% in 1993.37 
 
Division II proposals are exclusively consumer proposals.  "Consumer debtor" is defined in the 
BIA as “a natural person who is bankrupt or insolvent and whose aggregate debts, excluding any 
debts secured by the person's principal residence, do not exceed seventy-five thousand 
dollars”.38  A consumer proposal must be made to creditors generally, but is not binding on 
secured creditors that have not filed a proof of claim.39  While the statute does not distinguish 
between types of Division II proposals, the OSB collects data based on two types of filings. 
Where the individual debtor’s debts are 50% or more business related, the OSB terms their 
proposals “Division II business proposals”, even though they are filed by individuals under the 
Division II consumer proposal provisions. For consumer debtors whose liabilities are 50% or more 
consumer debt, the OSB collects the data under “consumer proposals”. 
 
Division II proposal proceedings are commenced by the debtor obtaining the assistance of an 
administrator in preparing the consumer proposal; and providing the administrator with the 
prescribed information on the consumer debtor's current financial situation.40  The duties of the 
administrator, a trustee or another insolvency professional, are set out in the statute.41   
 
A person already bankrupt can also make a proposal, but it must be approved by the inspectors 
of the bankruptcy estate and the bankrupt must have obtained the assistance of a trustee who will 
be the administrator of the consumer proposal.   
 
The administrator investigates the consumer debtor's property and financial affairs in order to 
assess with reasonable accuracy the consumer debtor's financial situation and the cause of 
insolvency.  The administrator provides counselling in accordance with directives issued by the 
OSB; prepares a consumer proposal; and files a copy of the proposal, signed by the consumer 
debtor, with the Official Receiver.42   Within ten days following, the administrator prepares and 
files with the Official Receiver a report on the results of the investigation; the administrator's 
opinion as to whether the consumer proposal is reasonable and fair to the consumer debtor and 
his or her creditors; whether the consumer debtor will be able to perform the proposal; a 
condensed statement of the consumer debtor's assets, liabilities, income and expenses; and a list 
of the creditors whose claims exceed two hundred and fifty dollars.43   
 
A consumer proposal must provide for the payment of preferred claims; for the payment of all 
prescribed fees and expenses of the administrator related to the proposal proceedings and of any 
person providing counselling.44 The proposal must also set out the manner of distributing 
dividends.  A proposal typically takes three to five years to complete the payment schedule. 
                                                 
35
 It is possible to make a joint consumer proposal to consumer debtors who do not have total debts 
exceeding $75 000. Two or more consumer proposals may be joined where they could reasonably be dealt 
with together because of the financial relationship of the consumer debtors involved. BIA, s. 66.12(1.1). 
36
 OSB, at 37. 
37
 Ibid. 
38
 BIA, s. 66.11. That cap will increase to $250,000 when the new amendments are proclaimed in force. 
39
 BIA, s. 66.28. 
40
 BIA, s. 66.13 (1). 
41
 BIA, s. 66.13. 
42
 BIA., s. 66.13 (2). 
43
 BIA., s. 66.14. 
44
 BIA, s. 66.12(6). 
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The administrator sends a copy of the proposal and the report to creditors, along with a claims 
form and a statement explaining that a meeting of creditors will be called only if the Official 
Receiver directs the administrator to call a meeting of creditors within 45 days, or if creditors 
having an aggregate of at least 25% in value of the proven claims request a meeting.45 In most 
cases, no meeting of creditors to vote on the proposal is necessary.  
 
Creditors have up to 45 days to consider whether to accept or reject the proposal. If creditors do 
not respond, they are considered to have accepted the proposal. If a sufficient number of 
creditors accept the proposal, it is binding on the debtor and creditors. Where, at the expiration of 
the 45 day period no obligation has arisen to call a meeting of creditors, the consumer proposal is 
deemed accepted by the creditors.46  No court hearing is required, unless the administrator 
receives a request from the Official Receiver or any other interested party within 15 days of the 
acceptance or deemed acceptance of the proposal; and failing such request, the proposal is 
deemed approved by the court.47  Hence, the proceeding is highly streamlined and cost effective, 
saving time and resources in terms of creditors’ meetings and court appearances where creditors 
and the Official Receiver do not object to the proposal.  When the proposal is fully performed, the 
administrator submits a certificate of full performance to the debtor and the Official Receiver.  
 
If the proposal is rejected by creditors, the stay under the BIA is no longer in effect and creditors 
can move to enforce their claims.  If the debtor fails to comply with the terms of the proposal, the 
court, on application, can annul the proposal where it appears to the court that the debtor was not 
eligible to make a consumer proposal when the proposal was filed; or where the consumer 
proposal cannot continue without injustice or undue delay; or where the approval of the court was 
obtained by fraud. The effect of annulment is a deemed assignment in bankruptcy.48  
 
In addition to these provisions, a consumer proposal is deemed annulled where payments under 
a consumer proposal are to be made monthly or more frequently and the consumer debtor is in 
default to the extent of three months payments; or where payments under a consumer proposal 
are to be made less frequently than monthly and the consumer debtor is in default for more than 
three months on any payment.49 The exception to the deemed annulment is where the court has 
previously ordered otherwise or where an amendment to the consumer proposal is filed before 
the deemed annulment.50 
 
On annulment of a consumer proposal, if the debtor was insolvent prior to making the proposal, 
creditors have a claim against the debtor for the amount owed to them before the proposal, minus 
any amount the debtor paid them during the proposal. If the debtor was bankrupt when the 
proposal was made and the court subsequently annuls the proposal, the debtor is considered 
bankrupt on the date of the annulment. 
 
The OSB reports that the failure rate of consumer proposals is about 30%, although it is important 
to examine at what point the proposal fails, as discussed below.  By way of comparison, the 
failure rate under Chapter 13 of the US Bankruptcy Code is more than double this rate.51 
                                                 
45
 BIA, s. 66.15. 
46
 BIA, s. 66.18.    
47
 BIA, s. 66.22. 
48
 BIA, s. 66.30. 
49
 BIA, s. 66.31. 
50
 BIA, s. 66.31. 
51
 Jacob Ziegel, Anthony Duggan and Thomas Telfer, Canadian Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law, Cases, 
Text and Materials (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2003) at 614.  They suggest that the higher US rate is 
due to the fact that the ratio of Chapter 13 to Chapter 5 cases is about twice the ratio of consumer proposals 
to bankruptcies in Canada, and hence a number of debtors appear to be opting for proposals when perhaps 
they should be in liquidation, and second, that US consumers have previously had stronger incentives to opt 
for Chapter 13, even where the prospects for successful plan completion are not good. The incentives 
 11 
 
Professors Ziegel, Telfer and Duggan have suggested that there are two possible explanations 
for the growth in Division II proposals since the mid-1990s, the first being that in 1997, 
amendments to the BIA required individual bankrupts to make mandatory surplus income 
payments; and second, the fee structure in the bankruptcy rules was substantially altered in 1998 
to give trustees a stronger incentive to recommend consumer proposals to debtors.52   
 
 
3. Division I Proposals 
 
Division I proposals are available for individuals and businesses, and frequently used where the 
debts are more than 75,000 CAD and thus Division II is not available. Often the debtor needs 
time to prepare a proposal and so the legislation allows the debtor to file a “notice of intention to 
make a proposal”, which creates a stay on creditors’ enforcing their claims for a specified period 
until the debtor is able to make a proposal.53    
 
A proposal trustee performs many of the same functions as an administrator in a Division II 
proposal, assessing the debtor’s ability to make a proposal, monitoring the process, and assisting 
the debtor with mandatory filing requirements. As with Division II proposals, the Division I 
proposal provisions are highly codified, creating some certainty and predictability for both debtors 
and creditors.   
 
Filing a notice of intention to make a proposal creates an automatic stay for 30 days, and the 
court has the authority to extend the stay for periods up to 45 days to a maximum of six months. 
The stay affords the debtor breathing space to devise a proposal that will be acceptable to 
creditors.54  The debtor must file a projected cash flow statement with a trustee and the trustee 
must report on the reasonableness of the statement.55  When the debtor has a proposal to 
present to creditors, a meeting is called, which allows creditors to vote on the proposed plan.56 
The statute requires that a majority of creditors in number and two-thirds in value of the claims of 
each class of creditor vote in favour of the proposal.57  If the debtor garners the requisite support, 
the proposal is brought to the court for approval.58   
 
The BIA sets out specific requirements of the proposal, in terms of the priority of claims that must 
be observed in a proposal, the fees and expenses of the trustee, specified Crown claims, and 
specified amounts owing to employees where the debtor is a business.59  The court has the 
authority to annul a proposal if there is a default in the performance of any provision of the 
proposal, where the court’s approval was obtained by fraud, or where it appears that the debtor 
cannot continue the proposal without injustice or undue delay.60 
 
While Division I proposals were originally aimed particularly at small and medium size 
businesses, in terms of giving them an accessible and cost effective mechanism to devise an 
                                                                                                                                                 
include the fact that Chapter 13 has a substantially higher ceiling for the admissible amount of debt; it 
permits the debtor to modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim secured only by a 
security interest in the debtor’s principal residence and provides for the waiving or curing of any default; 
the list of non-dischargeable debts is smaller in Chapter 13 than it is for Chapter 7 filings; and the courts 
can grant hardship relief, although this authority is rarely exercised, ibid. at 612-614. 
52
 Ibid. at 613. 
53
 BIA, s. 50(1) and s. 50.4. 
54
 BIA, s. 50.4. 
55
 BIA, s. 50.4(2). 
56
 BIA, ss. 51, 54. 
57
 BIA, ss. 54, 62. 
58
 BIA, ss. 58, 59. 
59
 BIA, s. 60. 
60
 BIA, s. 63. 
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arrangement with creditors to avoid bankruptcy and liquidation, they have been used increasingly 
by individuals whose debts exceed the cap allowable under the Division II consumer proposal 
provisions.  This use is likely to shift somewhat if and when the amendments to the BIA are 
proclaimed in force, in that the cap under Division II will be increased to debts of 250,000 CAD.  
The files examined for purposes of this study were individual debtors using the Division I 
provisions, not companies.   
 
The next part examines the causes of insolvency, the nature and type of liabilities and assets for 
each of the four data sets in the study. 
 
 
V. Primary Causes of Insolvency and Nature of Debts and Assets 
 
The study analysed the data for the primary causes of insolvency for the 5,773 files examined, 
broken down by Division I proposals, Division II consumer proposals, Division II business 
proposals by individuals, and bankruptcies, as set out in Graphs 1 to 4 below.  As noted in the 
introduction, the causes had to be pulled manually from the files.  The data offers fresh evidence 
and insight into why debtors might choose a proposal instead of bankruptcy, based on the cause 
of the financial distress and the nature and quantum of debt. 
 
 
1. Division II Consumer Proposals 
 
Graph 1 sets out the primary causes of insolvency for debtors that filed Division II consumer 
proposals between 2005 and 2007.  Of 2,967 sample files reported in Graph 1, the primary 
causes of insolvency were over-extension of credit and money mismanagement.  20% (588) of 
the Division II consumer debtors declared overextension of credit as the primary cause of their 
insolvency, while 25% (731) reported that it was money mismanagement.  These figures align 
with data in the US, which cites overextension of credit as a significant contributing factor to 
insolvency.61 
 
Graph 1 
                                                 
61
 Ronald J. Mann, Charging Ahead, The Growth and Regulation of Payment Card Markets, (Cambridge 
University Press, 2006). See also articles from the Consumer Bankruptcy Project, cited at note 4. 
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Graph 1 also indicates that for just over 12% (366), the primary cause was loss of employment 
income and for 14% (415), the cause was seasonal employment or insufficient income.  
Together, therefore, employment related causes as the primary cause of insolvency comprised 
26% of all debtors in the cohort. In this respect, Division II proposals offer consumer debtors relief 
from the temporary loss of employment or reduction in work.  The statistics also support the 
finding of US scholars, who have observed that individuals are often driven to insolvency 
proceedings due to exogenous shocks such as job loss.62 
 
8% (255) cited medical reasons for the insolvency, although it is difficult to discern from the data 
in any statistically significant manner if the rates refer to medical bills over and above coverage by 
the national healthcare system, or if some portion is due to lost income arising from medical 
problems. These causes appear somewhat conflated in the reported descriptions field, and 
deserve further study, particularly since Canada has a socialized health care system, where 
medical costs should not be a bar either to access to health care or a financial burden.  
 
Only 2.3% cited the primary cause as failure to pay taxes.  Relationship breakdown, which 
includes marriage breakdown and breakdown of a common law relationship, accounted for 8.9% 
(264) of the insolvencies. Student debts, child support and level of pension were not significant 
causes of insolvency for this group of consumer debtors.  There had been anecdotal evidence 
from trustees that gambling and addiction are growing causes of individual insolvency, but such 
causes are not statistically significant in the reported reasons.  However, the figures may be 
partially unreliable because of the stigma associated with such disclosures and because such 
addictions may be the underlying reason for over-extension of credit or money mismanagement.   
 
 
                                                 
62
 Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook, The Fragile Middle Class, supra, note 4. 
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Given that over extension of credit was the primary cause of insolvency for one fifth of all the files, 
and that 90% of all debtors filing Division II consumer proposals had credit card debt, Table 1 
below analyzes in some depth the sources of debt for this group of debtors.  Overall, the total 
debt for this cohort was 249,105,530 CAD of which almost 58% was secured.  However, if one 
excludes liability for real property mortgages that are residential homes, only 10.4% of the 
remaining total debts were secured debt. The data suggest that while home ownership is a 
significant asset for some debtors, it is coupled with significant mortgage debt, which comprises 
the majority of secured debt of Division II consumer debtors. Over-extension of credit was cited 
as the secondary cause of insolvency for an additional 11.3% of consumer debtors in this 
category.   
 
Table 1 illustrates that credit card debt is a particularly acute problem.  18.2% of total liabilities for 
this category of consumer proposals were for credit card debt, both credit cards issued by banks 
and those issued by retail stores and other non-bank lenders. 99.6% of that debt was unsecured.  
The average (mean) debt was 12,419 CAD for credit cards issued by banks and trust companies 
and the median was 9,045 CAD. These figures are lower for credit cards issued by retail stores, 
etc., specifically 7,222 CAD was the mean and 4,884 CAD was the median.    
 
13% of all liabilities were for bank loans, excluding real property residential mortgages, with a 
mean debt of 16, 605 CAD and a median debt of 13,218 CAD.  66.5% of all debtors in this cohort 
held such bank loans. Trustees have attributed the high amount of unsecured bank loan debt to 
the introduction of on-line credit applications and approvals, increasing the ease with which 
debtors acquire such loans. This amount represents the greatest amount of median debt after 
mortgage debt, about the same median as credit card debt owed when credit card debt of all 
types are tallied.  
 
Table 1 also indicates that finance company loans comprised 5.9% of total liabilities for debtors 
filing Division II consumer proposals.  In the Division II consumer proposal cohort, 44% of debtors 
had finance company loans, with the mean amount owed 11,380 CAD and the median 9,000 
CAD. Trustees have reported that there are often consolidating loans whereby debtors get credit 
card debt consolidated into a lower interest rate loan, and that this effort to control debt is 
frequently undertaken before any insolvency filing, as a mechanism to address financial strain.  
Two thirds of these loans are secured.  
 
 
 
Table 1 
Sources of Debt for Debtors Filing Division II Consumer Proposals 
Type of Debt Total 
(Preferred, 
Unsecured 
and 
Secured) 
Secured 
Amounts 
Unsecured 
Amounts 
Preferred 
Amounts 
Number of 
Estates 
(Preferred, 
Unsecured 
and 
Secured) 
Mean 
(Preferred, 
Unsecured 
and 
Secured) 
 Median 
(Preferred, 
Unsecured 
and 
Secured)  
Bank Loans 
(except real 
property 
mortgage) 
     
32,744,404  
     
5,142,127  
   
27,602,277  
                
-   
        
1,972  
          
16,605  
          
13,218  
Credit Cards 
Bank/Trust 
Companies 
Issuers 
     
30,439,616  
          
81,570  
   
30,358,046  
                
-   
           
2,451  
          
12,419  
           
9,045  
Credit Cards 
Other Issuers 
     
14,890,905  
          
79,518  
   
14,811,386  
                
-   
           
2,062  
           
7,222  
           
4,884  
Finance Company                                                                
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Loans 14,713,800  4,988,816  9,724,984  -   1,293  11,380  9,000  
Loans from 
Individuals 
         
462,545  
          
34,877  
        
427,668  
                
-   
                
71  
           
6,515  
           
5,000  
Other      
14,141,308  
     
1,605,315  
   
12,529,743  
           
6,250  
           
1,692  
         
8,358  
           
3,966  
Real Property 
Mortgage 
   
132,972,293  
  
131,728,840  
     
1,243,453  
                
-   
              
934  
        
144,692  
        
137,137  
Student Loans      
3,048,292  
            
3,000  
     
3,045,292  
                
-   
              
268  
          
11,374  
           
7,547  
Taxes 
Federal/Provincial/ 
Municipal 
      
5,692,367  
        
122,300  
     
5,555,067  
          
15,000  
              
921  
           
6,181  
           
2,000  
 
Total 
   
249,105,530  
  
143,786,364  
  
105,297,916  
          
21,250  
 
         2,967 
  
        
 
 
Table 1 above also indicates that liability for mortgages on real property for this cohort was 53% 
of all liabilities by total dollar value, of which 99% was secured debt.  31.5% of all debtors in this 
cohort had mortgage debt.  In respect of the value of the home equity, these debtors declared 
house assets in the amount of 153,308,078 CAD, of which only 23,999,583 CAD or 16% was 
exempt, as indicated in Table 2 below.  The fact that 84% of mortgage home equity was non-
exempted assets suggests that the high degree of equity in the home was a significant factor in 
filing a proposal.  
 
A consumer proposal affords insolvent consumer debtors the opportunity to hold onto a house, 
and that avenue may be a driver in choice of solution to the financial distress.  The median 
amount of assets in a home for this cohort was 152,500 CAD.  Comparing median mortgage debt 
and median house assets, consumer debtors filing Division II consumer proposals had a median 
amount of about 15,000 CAD of house equity to protect.  Given that Canada has modest 
exemption amounts for home, with some jurisdictions having no exemption, proposals offer a 
means of retaining that equity while managing the burden of debts faced by the consumer debtor.  
 
Table 1 indicates that taxes comprised 2.3% of all liabilities; and while 31% of this cohort had 
outstanding tax debt, the median amount was only 2,000 CAD.  Student loans were 1.2% of total 
liabilities, but 31% of all debtors in this cohort had outstanding student loans.  
 
Table 2 breaks down the assets of debtors by type of asset.  One can see that after an interest in 
a house, the value of cottages and motor vehicles is relatively high.  The retention of a car for 
purposes of commuting to work is a key driver in the US, and these data appear to align, with the 
median for automobiles, motor cycles and other motor vehicles over 4,000 CAD.  While there is 
some exemption for motor vehicles on bankruptcy, Table 2 illustrates that overall, 63% of the 
automobile assets were non-exempt, had the consumer debtor opted for bankruptcy.  Other 
assets have a relatively low median value. 
 
 
Table 2  
Assets of Debtors Filing Division II Consumer Proposals 
 Type of Asset Total (Exempt 
and Non-
Exempt) 
Exempt 
Amounts 
Non-Exempt 
Amounts 
Estimated 
Realizable 
Number of 
Estates  
Mean (Exempt 
and Non-
Exempt) 
 Median 
(Exempt 
and Non-
Exempt)  
Automobile      13,463,914       4,946,499       8,517,415          659,635             1,928             6,983                
4,606  
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Cash on hand          264,674            12,481          252,193          195,429                352                752                  
250  
Cash surrender 
value 
      9,642,021       6,863,640       2,778,381       1,113,410                721            13,373                
4,000  
Cottage          524,500          454,000            70,500            14,400                    8            65,563              
24,500  
Estimated tax 
refund 
           22,280                  -              22,280            17,140                  13             1,714                  
950  
Furniture       6,153,009       6,041,870          111,139             8,491             2,489             2,472                
1,800  
House     153,308,078     23,999,583    129,308,495       4,899,440                934          164,141            
152,500  
Land          432,770            16,810          415,960            85,312                  18            24,043              
14,250  
Motorcycle          328,331            71,304          257,027            43,850                  59             5,565                
4,225  
Other assets       2,191,079       1,213,309          977,770          389,352                342             6,407                
1,500  
Other motor 
vehicle 
         485,002            88,700          396,302            57,025                  68             7,132                
4,400  
Personal effects       2,396,789       2,355,826            40,963            22,623             1,819             1,318                
1,000  
Recreational 
equipment 
         335,036            20,700          314,336            60,927                  70             4,786                
2,250  
Securities       3,036,955       1,901,801       1,135,154          350,745                315             9,641                
2,492  
Snowmobile            46,150                600            45,550             6,172                  20             2,308                
1,700  
Total    192,630,587     47,987,123    144,643,464       7,923,951             2,967     
 
 
 
2.    Division II Business Proposals 
 
Turning to the next data set, Graph 2 summarizes the causes of financial distress for individuals 
that are insolvent and filed Division II consumer proposals, but they are classified as “business 
proposals” by the OSB because 50% or more of their debt is business-related. There are 1,063 
files in this cohort.  This category is comprised primarily of individuals that were sole proprietors 
or in a small partnership.  24% (255) of the Division II business proposal debtors declared 
overextension of credit as the primary cause of their insolvency, while 15.5% (165) reported that it 
was money mismanagement.   
 
For 17% (180), the primary cause was loss of employment income and for 15.5% (165), the 
cause was seasonal employment or insufficient income.  Interestingly, although called business 
proposals by the OSB’s 50% business debt measure, only 3.5% (37) report a failed business as a 
cause of the insolvency. One possible explanation is that the objective of making the proposal is 
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to salvage the business activity where possible; hence, the debtor does not declare the business 
failed.   This figure can be compared, for example, with the bankruptcy data in Graph 4, below, 
where failed businesses account for almost three times the number of primary causes of 
bankruptcy. 
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The data indicates that in a number of cases, other financial pressures placed the individual into 
financial distress and the business proposal provided the mechanism to try to preserve the 
business.  Surprisingly, 15% (158) reported medical reasons as the primary cause of their 
insolvency, a considerably higher percentage than for the other two proposal categories.  One 
explanation for this higher figure is that the individual in many cases would not have access to 
supplemental health benefits and income replacement that is often available in an employment 
relationship with companies.  If the business is a sole proprietorship, any lengthy illness can place 
the business at risk as the individual is not able to perform the services offered by the business. 
 
Only 1.1% (12) of Division II business debtors cited the cause as failure to pay taxes.  
Relationship breakdown, student debts, child support and level of pension also were not 
significant causes of the insolvency, as illustrated in Graph 2 
 
Turning to the types of liabilities these individuals had at the time of filing, Table 3 sets out the 
sources of debt for the cohort of debtors that filed Division II business proposals.  Here again, 
mortgages play a significant role in the insolvency and may be a driver for filing a proposal rather 
than bankruptcy. 60.8% of total liabilities for this cohort are mortgage debt, of which the 
overwhelming majority is secured.  The mean and median amounts per individual are almost 
identical to that for other Division II consumer debtors. 
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14.6% of total liabilities are for credit card debt, of which 98% is unsecured. The average is higher 
than for Division II consumer proposal debtors, but the mean is comparable.  12.3% of total 
liabilities are for bank loans, excluding mortgages on real property.  Here both the mean and 
median are 5-6,000 CAD more than the median amount for the individuals in the consumer 
Division II cohort, 22,263 CAD and 18,192 CAD respectively for this group. One explanation is 
that the nature of the business debts may result in higher level of liabilities, even for debtors with 
less than 75,000 CAD in debt.  The data also indicate that individuals filing business proposals 
rely heavily on credit card debt and bank loans as a means of financing their business activities. 
 
Table 3 also highlights that 5.7% of total liabilities, a median of 10,000 CAD, are for finance 
company loans, most of which were unsecured.  The reason for this relatively high figure is likely 
the same as for consumers filing Division II consumer proposals, as discussed above.  However, 
another explanation is that finance companies are willing to extend operating loans to small 
businesses on an unsecured basis, as long as the amounts remain modest.  
 
Here again, the amount of tax owed is only 1.3% of total liabilities by dollar amount, suggesting 
that tax relief for this cohort is not a significant factor in choice of proceeding.  However, 40% of 
all those filing had taxes owing, with the median at 1,964 CAD.  This figure suggests that while 
tax debt is not a primary cause of insolvency for this group, a significant number of people may let 
their taxes slide in the period prior to becoming financially distressed. 
 
 
Table 3 
Source of Debt Division II Business Proposals 
 
 
Type of Debt 
Total 
(Preferred, 
Unsecured 
and 
Secured) 
Secured 
Amounts 
Unsecured 
Amounts 
Preferred 
Amounts 
Number of 
Estates 
(Preferred, 
Unsecured 
and 
Secured) 
Mean 
(Preferred, 
Unsecured 
and 
Secured) 
 Median 
(Preferred, 
Unsecured 
and 
Secured)  
Bank Loans 
(except real 
property 
mortgage) 
     
17,342,925  
     
3,178,779  
   
14,164,146  
                
-   
              
779  
          
22,263  
          
18,192  
Credit Cards 
Bank/Trust 
Companies 
Issuers 
     
12,779,590  
          
33,250  
   
12,746,340  
                
-   
              
907  
          
14,090  
           
9,911  
Credit Cards 
Other Issuers 
      
7,747,140  
          
12,013  
     
7,735,127  
                
-   
              
844  
           
9,179  
           
5,843  
Finance Company 
Loans 
      
8,004,626  
     
2,835,589  
     
5,169,037  
                
-   
              
605  
          
13,231  
          
10,000  
Loans from 
Individuals 
         
181,552  
          
57,000  
        
124,552  
                
-   
                
23  
           
7,894  
           
5,000  
Other       
6,381,596  
        
701,235  
     
5,677,061  
           
3,300  
              
707  
           
9,026  
           
4,339  
Real Property 
Mortgage 
  
85,775,072  
   
84,972,365  
        
802,707  
                
-   
              
592  
        
144,890  
        
137,000  
Student Loans          
935,623  
            -           
928,623  
           
7,000  
                
90  
          
10,396  
        
7,367  
 19 
Taxes 
Federal/Provincial/ 
Municipal 
      
1,868,519  
          
93,695  
     
1,759,824  
          
15,000  
              
422  
           
4,428  
           
1,964  
Total 141,016,643 91,883,925 49,107,417 25,300    
 
 
Table 4 sets out the summary data on the assets of debtors filing Division II business proposals.  
The median amount of house value is 150,000 CAD and compared with mortgage liabilities for 
this cohort, there is a median amount of equity of close to 15,000 CAD, almost the same as the 
Division II consumer proposal group.  Also similar to that group, here there are significant assets 
in motor vehicles of different kinds, cottages and land, the vast majority of which are non-exempt 
assets.  The median amount of securities held by this group is higher than that for the Division II 
consumer proposal debtors, with a mean of 13,115 CAD and median of 3,200 CAD. 
 
Table 4 
Assets for Debtors Filing Division II Business Proposals 
 
 Type of Asset Total 
(Exempt 
and Non-
Exempt) 
Exempt 
Amounts 
Non-
Exempt 
Amounts 
Estimated 
Realizable 
Number of 
Estates 
(Exempt 
and Non-
Exempt) 
Mean 
(Exempt 
and Non-
Exempt) 
 Median 
(Exempt 
and Non-
Exempt)  
Automobile       
7,442,293  
     
2,249,066  
     
5,193,227  
        
281,246  
              
896  
           
8,306  
           
5,750  
Cash on hand          
190,998  
          
18,389  
        
172,609  
        
153,721  
              
137  
           
1,394  
              
250  
Cash surrender 
value 
      
5,360,655  
     
4,279,992  
     
1,080,663  
        
361,250  
              
331  
          
16,195  
           
5,532  
Cottage          
129,900  
                -           
129,900  
          
76,800  
                  
7  
          
18,557  
          
16,000  
Estimated tax 
refund 
                   
1  
            -                
1  
                  
1  
                  
1  
                  
1  
                  
1  
Furniture       
3,307,865  
     
3,245,504  
          
62,361  
           
9,745  
              
869  
           
3,807  
           
3,000  
House       
94,030,201  
   
12,680,658  
   
81,349,543  
     
2,318,804  
              
604  
        
155,679  
        
150,000  
Land          
225,046  
                -           
225,046  
          
79,117  
                
15  
          
15,003  
           
8,946  
Motorcycle            
81,899  
          
32,550  
          
49,349  
           
9,351  
                
26  
           
3,150  
           
2,000  
Other assets       
1,632,370  
        
730,052  
        
902,319  
        
159,909  
              
162  
          
10,076  
           
2,000  
Other motor 
vehicle 
         
361,766  
          
34,500  
        
327,266  
          
66,495  
                
54  
           
6,699  
           
4,000  
Personal effects       
1,146,020  
     
1,128,490  
          
17,530  
           
7,500  
              
590  
           
1,942  
           
1,000  
Recreational 
equipment 
         
226,976  
          
17,200  
        
209,776  
          
64,407  
                
45  
           
5,044  
           
2,500  
Securities       
1,796,801  
     
1,545,574  
        
251,227  
          
92,831  
              
137  
          
13,115  
           
3,200  
Snowmobile            
45,051  
           
6,500  
          
38,551  
          
12,400  
                
24  
           
1,877  
           
1,250  
National    
115,977,843  
   
25,968,474  
   
90,009,368  
     
3,693,578  
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3.  Division I Proposals 
 
Turning to the Division I proposals by individuals, Graph 3, below, summarizes the data for 743 
Division I proposal files.  Here, debtors generally have more than 75,000 CAD in debt, excluding 
mortgages on the home. The most frequent causes of insolvency were over-extension of credit, a 
failed business and money mismanagement.  20.3% (151) of the Division I consumer debtors 
declared overextension of credit as the primary cause of their insolvency.  16% (119) declared a 
failed business to be the primary cause for filing a Division I proposal.  14.4% (107) reported that 
it was money mismanagement.   
 
Graph 3 illustrates that only 7.1% (53) reported that the primary cause was loss of employment 
income, considerably less than for Division II.  For 9% (68), the primary cause was seasonal 
employment or insufficient income.  12% of Division I individual debtors cited the cause as failure 
to pay taxes, significantly higher than observed for Division II proposals.  Marriage breakdown 
and breakdown of a common law relationship accounted for 10.9% (81) of the insolvencies. 
Student debts, child support and level of pension were not significant causes of the insolvency. 
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Causes of Insolvency for Debtors in Division I proposals
 
 
 
Analyzing the sources of debt for this cohort, Table 5 illustrates that 14.3% of total liabilities are 
credit card debt.  The median amounts are more than double those for Division II proposals, not 
surprising given the liability cap on Division II proposals. 14.3% of total liabilities are bank loans, 
excluding real property mortgages.  The mean and median of bank loans owed are higher than 
for Division II proposals, the mean being double the amount.  27.8% is mortgage debt, of which 
95% is secured.  Here again, both the mean and median are higher than for the other categories 
of proposals. 
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Interestingly, 17.2% of all liabilities are for taxes owing, a significantly higher amount than for the 
other proposal categories.  Equally, while the mean owing was 91,627 CAD, the mean was 
30,300 CAD, a fairly significant tax debt.  These figures suggest that debtors with significant tax 
debt are using Division I proposal proceedings as a mechanism to address their tax debt. They 
are frequently ineligible to file a proposal under Division II because of the quantum of debt overall.  
 
Five of the trustees interviewed for purposes of the study also observed that debtors with high tax 
debt, as well as others with considerable assets, may file a Division I proposal knowing that 
creditors, in particularly Canada Revenue Agency, will not support the proposal, resulting in 
automatic bankruptcy. They nevertheless file in this way, in order to bypass the stigma of the 
bankruptcy notices that must be publicly advertised when a debtor files bankruptcy proceedings. 
While the data cannot confirm the extent of such a practice, it may illustrate that the data do not 
paint the entire picture of why particular options are being chosen when a debtor becomes 
insolvent.   
 
Table 5 
Sources of Debt - Division I Proposals 
 
 
Type of Debt Total (Preferred, 
Unsecured and 
Secured) 
Secured 
Amounts 
Unsecured 
Amounts 
Preferred 
Amounts 
Mean 
(Preferred, 
Unsecured 
and 
Secured) 
Median 
(Preferred, 
Unsecured 
and 
Secured) 
Bank Loans 
except real 
property mortgage 
27,118,428 6,991,658 20,126,769 - 51,361 35,467 
Credit Cards 
Bank/Trust 
19,859,184 618,098 19,241,086 - 33,660 22,762 
Credit Cards 
Other Issuers 
7,249,875 25,000 7,224,875 - 15,969 8,387 
Finance Company 
Loans 
11,718,043 3,934,279 7,783,764 - 36,965 16,000 
Loans from 
Individuals 
4,597,302 202,000 4,395,302 - 117,880 19,500 
Other 32,341,410 4,654,182 27,671,444 15,784 70,155 12,700 
Real Property 
Mortgage 
52,683,548 49,907,256 2,776,292 - 176,790 150,952 
Student Loans 1,163,067 10,000 1,153,067 - 20,405 11,383 
Taxes 32,619,341 1,455,340 31,154,988 9,013 91,627 30,300 
National 189,350,198 67,797,813 121,527,588 24,797   
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Table 6 provides summary data of assets held by the individual debtors filing Division I proposals.  
The median value of houses is substantially higher than in the Division II cohorts, approximately 
36,000 CAD higher.  Table 6 illustrates that there are also significantly more assets in terms of 
land, recreational equipment, and securities held. With more debts than Division II debtors, this 
group of debtors has also had greater assets, which are at risk if the debtor is not able to 
successfully complete a proposal.  As noted above, debtors file Division I proposals to protect 
their assets, but the fact that the same stigma does not attach to a proposal as a bankruptcy may 
offer another explanation of choice of proceeding.  While there has been a public policy shift 
away from viewing bankruptcy as a negative status, studies in both Canada and the US indicate 
that there continues to be considerable stigma associated with filing bankruptcy.63 
 
 
Table 6 
Assets for Debtors Filing Division I Proposals 
 Type of 
Asset 
Total (Exempt and 
Non-Exempt) 
Exempt 
Amounts 
Non-Exempt 
Amounts 
Estimated 
Realizable 
Number of 
Estates 
(Exempt and 
Non-
Exempt) 
Mean 
(Exempt 
and Non-
Exempt) 
 Median 
(Exempt 
and 
Non-
Exempt)  
Automobile       6,348,458       2,900,667       3,447,792          184,639                502            
12,646  
           
7,501  
Cash on hand          875,526            35,000          840,526          752,095                118             
7,420  
              
500  
Cash 
surrender 
value 
     13,097,723     10,724,902       2,372,821       1,131,598                315            
41,580  
          
10,000  
Cottage          397,600                  -            397,600            87,383                    8            
49,700  
          
27,500  
Estimated tax 
refund 
           26,785                  -              26,785            19,665                    7             
3,826  
           
1,820  
Furniture       1,947,091       1,908,976            38,115            15,665                609             
3,197  
           
2,500  
House       73,177,072     19,974,131     53,202,941       5,334,768                345          
212,107  
        
186,930  
Land       2,166,230          106,800       2,059,430          392,999                  25            
86,649  
          
69,600  
Motorcycle          210,350            74,000          136,350            32,275                  28             
7,513  
           
6,000  
Other assets       7,394,391       2,912,689       4,481,703          992,554                247            
29,937  
           
3,500  
Other motor 
vehicle 
         582,350          152,700          429,650            86,116                  36            
16,176  
           
6,250  
Personal 
effects 
         817,355          794,135            23,220            29,180                467             
1,750  
           
1,000  
Recreational 
equipment 
      1,008,523             5,000       1,003,523          197,120                  73            
13,815  
           
7,000  
Securities       1,413,361          589,661          823,700          512,293                  48            
29,445  
           
7,501  
Snowmobile            67,550                  -              67,550            28,000                  19             
3,555  
           
2,000  
National    109,530,366     40,178,660     69,351,706       9,796,349        
        
 
                                                 
63
 Sarra, supra, note 7 and Lawless et al, supra, note 4. 
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Having now analyzed a snap shot of proposal debtors in terms of causes, assets and liabilities, 
their files are compared with 1,000 representative bankrupts on the same criteria. 
 
 
4.  Consumer Bankruptcies 
 
One can contrast the causes of insolvency for proposals with the sample of consumer 
bankruptcies, as illustrated by Graph 4.  Here we see a somewhat different pattern for the sample 
of 1,000 files.  Overextension of credit is by far the most significant cause of insolvency. 22% of 
the debtors filing consumer bankruptcy reported overextension of credit as the primary cause of 
their insolvency.  A smaller percentage, only 9.2%, reported money mismanagement.  Loss of 
employment income as the primary cause was 12.8%. For 15%, the cause was seasonal 
employment or insufficient income, only slightly higher than for those that filed consumer 
proposals.  Together then, almost 28% of consumer bankrupts had employment related causes of 
insolvency. 
 
Slightly higher, 3.6% of bankrupts cited the primary cause as failure to pay taxes.  Relationship 
breakdown, which includes marriage breakdown and breakdown of a common law relationship 
accounted for 8.9% (264) of the insolvencies. Student debts, child support and level of pension 
were not significant causes of insolvency, the same as for those filing Division II proposals.   
 
A higher number of bankrupts cited medical reasons as the primary cause of insolvency, 11.3% 
compared with 8.6% for debtors filing Division II proposals.  Medical problems cited included 
supplementary medical bills, loss of employment from extended illness, and loss of income to be 
home to care for elderly and ill family members, including parents and children.  The disclosed 
information was too limited and could have benefited from more in-depth survey or interview 
information. The high rate is of significant concern as Canada prides itself on its socialized 
healthcare system. Further research should be conducted to examine more precisely the extent 
to which medical issues are facing consumer debtors in insolvency proceedings. 
 
Failed business was also reported as 9.1% for consumer bankrupts, compared with only 3.5% of 
those filing a consumer proposal.  In terms of marriage and common law relationship breakdown, 
for 10.3% of consumer bankrupts it was the primary cause of financial distress, whereas it was 
8.9% for Division II proposal filers. 
 
Graph 4 
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Turning to the sources of debt for this cohort, Table 7 illustrates that 17% of the total debt was 
from credit card debt, a median of 14,137 CAD. Mortgages comprise 22.3% of the liabilities, 
105,430 CAD; and bank loans 15%, with the median being 14,137 CAD.  Finance company loans 
comprised 7% of total liabilities, a median of 9,000 CAD.  A greater percentage reported taxes 
owing as a primary cause, compared with those debtors filing Division II consumer proposals. 
However, the median amount owing of 3,204 CAD remains relatively low.  Overall, 72% of debt 
was unsecured.  The significance of these amounts is set out in the preliminary observations 
below. 
 
Table 7 
Sources of Debt Consumer Bankruptcies 
 
 
Total 
(Preferred, 
Unsecured 
and 
Secured) 
Secured 
Amounts 
Unsecured 
Amounts 
Preferred 
Amounts 
Number of 
Estates 
(Preferred, 
Unsecured 
and 
Secured) 
Mean 
(Preferred, 
Unsecured 
and 
Secured) 
 Median 
(Preferred, 
Unsecured 
and 
Secured)  
Bank Loans (except real 
property mortgage) 
     
14,298,254  
  
2,534,742  
   
11,763,512  
                
-   
              
609  
          
23,478  
          
14,137  
Credit Cards Bank/Trust 
Companies Issuers 
     
11,216,560  
        
107,902  
   
11,108,659  
                
-   
              
752  
          
14,916  
           
8,353  
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Credit Cards Other Issuers        
5,592,478  
          
25,350  
     
5,567,129  
                
-   
              
667  
           
8,385  
           
4,502  
Finance Company Loans        
6,610,546  
     
2,240,069  
     
4,370,477  
          
-   
              
449  
          
14,723  
           
9,000  
Loans from Individuals        
5,011,913  
          
55,000  
     
4,956,913  
                
-   
                
43  
        
116,556  
           
4,000  
Other      
23,936,534  
     
2,213,590  
   
21,696,594  
          
26,350  
              
695  
          
34,441  
           
4,925  
Real Property Mortgage      
21,919,095  
   
20,309,887  
     
1,609,209  
                
-   
              
173  
        
126,700  
        
105,430  
Student Loans      
1,390,952  
              
575  
     
1,390,377  
                
-   
              
126  
          
11,039  
           
8,500  
Taxes 
Federal/Provincial/Municipal 
       
8,219,035  
        
186,757  
     
8,030,410  
           
1,868  
              
368  
        
22,334  
           
3,204  
National      
98,195,368  
   
27,673,871  
   
70,493,280  
          
28,218  
   
        
 
 
In terms of assets for this cohort, overall, consumer bankrupts have fewer unencumbered assets 
and less equity in the home.  As the discussion in Part IX illustrates, in a number of cases, the 
equity for consumer bankrupts in the home is negative, meaning that bankruptcy may provide 
relief where there is no equity to protect and the mortgage debt is exacerbating the financial 
distress.  Given fewer assets overall, bankruptcy may be the most viable option for these debtors, 
given that it offers a shorter period of time to exit the process, and arguably a more cost effective 
means by which to rehabilitate their credit rating. 
 
 
Table 8 
Assets Consumer Bankruptcies 
 Type of Asset Total 
(Exempt and 
Non-
Exempt) 
Exempt 
Amounts 
Non-
Exempt 
Amounts 
Estimated 
Realizable 
Number of 
Estates 
(Exempt 
and Non-
Exempt) 
Mean 
(Exempt 
and Non-
Exempt) 
 Median 
(Exempt 
and 
Non-
Exempt)  
Automobile      
     3,666,166  
     
1,138,486  
     
2,527,680  
        
150,422  
          
583  
 
           6,288  
           
3,000  
Cash on hand            89,220             2,054           87,166           86,144  222                   402  200     
Cash surrender 
value 
   
   1,527,673  
     
1,074,983  
        
452,690  
        
124,147  
          
              122  
          
12,522  
           
3,950  
Cottage 93,512 
     
                -   93,512                6,200                    5  18,702     5,000         
Estimated tax 
refund 
             
             2,935  
              
 -   
          
 2,935  
       
    2,486  
                
                 3  
      
        978  
              
451  
 
Furniture 
 
      1,752,704  
     
1,732,909  
          
19,795  
        
   2,507  
              
             756  
 
           2,318  
           
2,000  
House       
    23,885,608  
     
5,328,571  
   
18,557,037  
        
168,383  
              
201  
        
118,834  
        
105,000  
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Land 
         
532,100  
        
159,600  
        
372,500  
          
 5,100  
               
  7  
          
76,014  
          
15,000  
 
Motorcycle 
          
 57,700  
          
10,900  
          
46,800  
          
7,950  
             
   13  
        
   4,438  
           
5,000  
 
Other assets 
    
  1,780,510  
        
388,981  
     
1,391,529  
          
73,744  
      
        116  
          
15,349  
           
1,500  
Other motor 
vehicle 
       
  192,659  
          
 9,300  
        
183,359  
      
     4,861  
             
   21  
     
      9,174  
           
2,859  
 
Personal effects 
      
   483,213  
        
473,464  
           
9,749  
       
    6,891  
      
        479  
       
    1,009  
              
500  
Recreational 
equipment 
       
  240,552  
          
30,700  
        
209,852  
          
17,153  
          
      32  
         
  7,517  
           
1,825  
Securities    
      957,328  
        
786,106  
        
171,222  
        
105,478  
            
    75  
          
12,764  
           
2,350  
Snowmobile           
 42,250  
          
 1,000  
          
41,250  
   
         4,325  
       
          9  
       
    4,694  
           
3,000  
National       
35,304,131  
   
11,137,054  
   
24,167,077  
        
765,790  
      
 
 
VI. Prior Bankruptcies and Proposals  
 
The study looked briefly at prior bankruptcies and prior proposals to see if anything could be 
discerned.  Tables from two of the proposal cohorts are included here.   It is evident from Table 9, 
below, that some jurisdictions, such as Alberta and Ontario, and to a lessor degree, British 
Columbia and Québec, have a number of second or more previous proposals and prior 
bankruptcies.  However, these figures do not really provide any insights independent of other 
information required.  They do not measure the regional breakdown by either population of the 
province or territory, or by the population of bankrupts in those regions.  It is difficult to determine 
if previous filers made filing choices this time in light of previous experience with proposals or 
bankruptcies, and whether that experience was positive or negative.  The Tables are included 
here only in hopes that it will spark the interests of legal scholars in the near future to examine 
these and other questions. 
 
 
   Table 9 
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        Prior Bankruptcies and Prior Proposals, Division 1 Proposal Cohort 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10 
Bankruptcies and Prior Proposals, Division II Business Proposal Cohort 
 
 
Prior 
Bankruptcy 
Prior 
Bankruptcy 
(%) 
Prior 
Proposal 
Prior 
Proposal 
(%) 
Alberta 6 2% - - 
British Columbia 10 4% 1 4% 
Manitoba 3 1% - - 
New Brunswick 1 0% - - 
Newfoundland 1 0% - - 
Northwest 
Territories - - - - 
Nova Scotia 14 5% - - 
Nunavut - - - - 
Ontario 125 49% 14 52% 
Prince Edward 
Island - - - - 
Québec 88 35% 12 44% 
Saskatchewan 7 3% - - 
Yukon - - - - 
National 255  27  
 
Province Prior 
Bankruptcy 
Prior 
Bankruptcy 
(%) 
Prior 
Proposal 
Prior 
Proposal 
(%) 
Alberta 32 29% 16 39% 
British Columbia 21 19% 5 12% 
Manitoba 1 1% - - 
New Brunswick 4 4% 1 2% 
Newfoundland 1 1% - - 
Northwest Territories - - - - 
Nova Scotia 1 1% 1 2% 
Nunavut - - - - 
Ontario 21 19% 8 20% 
Prince Edward Island - - - - 
Québec 18 16% 5 12% 
Saskatchewan 13 12% 5 12% 
Yukon - - - - 
National 112  41  
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Of note is that Berry and Duncan found that in 2006, 32% of insolvent pay day loan holders had 
previously filed bankruptcy or proposal proceedings, compared with 15% of those not holding pay 
day loans.64  However, they found that the incidence of filing proposals and bankruptcies was 
almost identical, suggesting that the data do not point to consumers filing for bankruptcy over a 
proposal based on the number of pay day loans held.65   
 
 
VII. Success and Failure Rates of Division II Proposals 
 
There were also some data on the success and failure rates of Division II proposals, which 
deserve brief mention here.  Table 11 examines the total number of proposals that failed, are 
ongoing and were successfully completed for 2002 to 2007.  However, given that most of the files 
from 2004 forward are still ongoing, there is little insight that can yet be drawn from 2006 and 
2007.  More significant, perhaps, is the data in Table 12, which indicates when and why 
proposals fail.  Even the incomplete data for 2006 and 2007 indicate the same pattern of failure 
for proposals. 
 
 
 
Table 11 
Division II Proposals by Year and Status at December 5, 2007 66 
Table of Div II proposals by year and status 
Group Year 
Failed Ongoing Success 
Total 
2002 5119 551 8684 14354 
2003 5218 2544 7748 15510 
2004 4983 5511 5159 15653 
2005 4539 9732 2393 16664 
2006 3620 13120 965 17705 
2007 1409 16688 294 18391 
Total 24888 48146 25243 98277 
 
                                                 
64
 Berry and Duncan, supra, note 24 at 13. 
65
 Ibid. 
66
 Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, data provided 2008. 
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Table 12 
Failed Division II Proposals by Year and Reason for Failure 2002 to December 2007 67 
 
 
 
Table of Div II Proposals by Year and Failed Estate Type Code 
 
Withdrawn Div 
II Proposal 
Before 
Approval (Ss. 
66.25) 
Rejected Div II 
Proposal - 
Creditor 
Acceptance 
Refused (Ss. 
66.19(1)) 
Refused 
Div II 
Proposal - 
Court 
Approval 
Refused 
(Ss. 
66.24(2)) 
Reinstated 
Bankruptcy 
- Div II 
Prop 
Withdrawn 
or Creditors 
Acceptance 
Refused 
Reinstated 
Bankruptcy 
- Div II 
Prop Court 
Approval 
Refused 
Deemed 
Annulment - Div 
II Proposal by a 
Debtor - In 
Default (Ss. 
66.31(1)) 
Court 
Annulment 
- Div II 
Proposal 
by a 
Debtor (Ss. 
66.3(1,3)) 
Deemed 
Annulment - 
Div II 
Proposal by 
a Bankrupt 
(no 
bankruptcy) 
Court 
Annulment - 
Div II 
Proposal by 
a Bankrupt 
(bankruptcy) 
(Ss. 
66.3(5)(a)) 
Total
2002 194 3.79% 401 7.83% 4 0.08% 6 0.12% 1 0.02% 4475 87.37% 8 0.16% 30 0.59% 3 0.06% 5122
2003 249 4.77% 545 10.44% 1 0.02% 7 0.13% 0 0.00% 4380 83.89% 14 0.27% 22 0.42% 3 0.06% 5221
2004 306 6.14% 583 11.70% 2 0.04% 10 0.20% 0 0.00% 4027 80.81% 27 0.54% 28 0.56% 0 0.00% 4983
2005 293 6.46% 542 11.94% 2 0.04% 2 0.04% 0 0.00% 3657 80.57% 32 0.71% 11 0.24% 0 0.00% 4539
2006 330 9.12% 622 17.18% 2 0.06% 3 0.08% 0 0.00% 2639 72.90% 7 0.19% 17 0.47% 0 0.00% 3620
2007 276 19.59% 498 35.34% 2 0.14% 2 0.14% 0 0.00% 627 44.50% 3 0.21% 1 0.07% 0 0.00% 1409
Total 1648 6.62% 3191 12.82% 13 0.05% 30 0.12% 1 0.00% 19805 79.56% 91 0.37% 109 0.44% 6 0.02% 24894
 
 
 
 
Taking 2002 to 2006 data only, 1,372 or 6% of 23,485 Division II proposals are withdrawn prior to 
approval, pursuant to ss. 66.25 of the BIA.  There had been observations by several trustees 
interviewed that the filing of a proposal proceeding serves as a placeholder for consumer debtors, 
granting them temporary relief from creditors until they determine what they are going to do about 
their financial distress.  This use of the stay is apparent in some cases, particularly commencing 
2004, but given the low overall percentage, it does not appear to be the predominant practice. 
 
The decision by creditors not to approve a proposal is a significant reason for a failed proposal.  
11.5% of proposals fail because creditors vote against the proposal.  However, almost 90% 
survive the creditor approval threshold. The high approval rate at this stage of the process is 
likely in large measure due to the statutory deemed creditor approval structure where creditors do 
not object in requisite numbers, as discussed in Part III. 
 
The court rarely refuses to approve a proposal once it has received requisite creditor support and 
thus the failure rates at this point in the proceeding are insignificant. 
 
The most significant reason for failure is the deemed annulment.  Again taking the 2002 to 2006 
data, 19,178 files failed due to the deemed annulment provisions.  That figure is 82% of all failed 
proposals.  The high rate of failure at this point is likely due to the arbitrariness of the deemed 
failure provisions and limited opportunity to salvage a proposal once three months of payments or 
three payments are missed, even where there are legitimate and temporary reasons for a missed 
payment and where a debtor otherwise has had an excellent payment record under the proposal.  
This problem is likely to be addressed with the 2007 reforms, expected to be in effect in 2009, as 
discussed below. 
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VIII. Percentage of Estate Recovered 
 
Not surprisingly, the data indicate that overall, recovery rates to creditors are higher under all 
types of proposals than they are on a bankruptcy.  In part, this greater recovery is due to the 
amount of assets and surplus income that such debtors have; and because the ability to make 
payments over three to five years enhances the ability of such debtors to meet a portion of their 
debt obligations. 
 
Graph 5 illustrates that for Division II consumer proposals, 63% of the files resulted in a 10% to 
40% recovery rate for creditors, after fees and disbursements were paid out.  Of that amount, one 
third recovered 20% to 30%. These figures suggest that proposals do allow some recovery for 
creditors, although not the full amount owed.  Less than one percent (0.65%) of the files allowed 
a recovery to creditors of more than 80%. 
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The graph for business proposals made by individual debtors under Division II proceedings 
reveals a similar pattern, as illustrated by Graph 6 below.  For the majority of the sample files, the 
rate of recovery of assets for creditors was between 10% and 40%.  In one third of files, creditors 
recovered 20% to 30% of the value of their claims. This figure affirms that proposals do allow 
some recovery for creditors, although not the full amount owed.  Less than one percent (0.65%) 
of the files allowed a recovery to creditors of more than 80%.  
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Graph 6  
Recovery Rate for Division II Business Proposals 
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Graph 7 illustrates that the recovery by percentage of debt is lower under Division I, although the 
amount of debt is considerably higher.  In the majority of cases, the recovery is less than 20% of 
total outstanding liabilities, suggesting that Division I proposals offer considerable relief to debtors 
from their outstanding debt. 
 
Graph 7 
Recovery Rates Division I Proposals 
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Finally, Graph 8 illustrates that there is relatively little recovery of debt under consumer 
bankruptcy proceedings, and creditors receive less than 10% of their claims in the vast majority of 
cases. In part, these figures are due to the lower asset levels of bankrupts, as discussed above, 
and in part, it is due to lower income and thus an inability of most consumer bankrupts to make 
surplus income payments.  
 
 
 
Graph 8 
Recovery Rates Bankruptcy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In looking at where creditors have realized on assets or income of the debtor, Graphs 9 to 12 
illustrate the receipts to the estate and thus to creditors, after fees and disbursements of the 
trustee or administrator. Unfortunately, the data were in a format that did not allow any firm 
conclusions in respect of choice of proceeding and method of realizing on claims. 
 
For Division II consumer and business proposals, the receipts come primarily from surplus 
payments, as illustrated in Graphs 9 and 10.  There was some limited recovery of assets under 
Division II business proposals, but payments were the principal source of receipts. 
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Graph 9 
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Graph 10 
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In contrast, Graph 11 illustrates that the value to meet creditors’ claims in a Division I proposal is 
drawn from a number of sources, including payments, tax return receipts, realized assets, RRSPs 
and cash on hand. 
 
        Graph 11 
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For bankruptcies, Graph 12 illustrates that most recoveries come from surplus income payments. 
There is not a clear explanation for this pattern, given that consumer debtors do have some non-
exempt assets.  Moreover, it is important to note that an estimated 85% of all consumer 
bankrupts do not have surplus income that is available to pay creditors’ claims. These data 
require further examination and more detailed information before any meaningful observations 
can be made. 
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Graph 12 
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Overall, these data offer some baseline information that could prove valuable in further 
assessment of consumer insolvency, either at a period after individual debtors exit insolvency 
proceedings, as a way of measuring the success of their choice of proceeding and longer term 
financial wealth; or as a baseline for future studies of the nature of consumer debtor financial 
distress.  Data is not currently collected on this basis, but such information would allow for deeper 
and more nuanced observations regarding the position of consumer debtors and their best 
options for remedying their financial distress. 
 
 
IX. Research Questions and Observations 
 
This part provides some summary observations in respect of the research questions. 
 
 
1.  Are the causes of financial distress a determinant of choice of proposal or bankruptcy? 
 
It does not appear from the data that the causes of bankruptcy, for the most part, are a 
determinant of choice of proposal or bankruptcy, although in particular instances, some debts 
may drive choices in one direction. The data above allow for some preliminary observations 
across data sets.  In terms of causes of insolvency, the top four causes are summarized for each 
cohort. For Division II consumer proposals, the top causes were money mismanagement (25%); 
overextension of credit (20%); seasonal employment/insufficient income (14%) and job loss 
(12%).  For Division II individual business proposals, the primary declared causes were 
overextension of credit (24%); money mismanagement (16%); job loss (17%) and seasonal 
employment/insufficient income (16%). For Division I proposals, those causes were 
 36 
overextension of credit (20%); failed business 16%); money mismanagement (14%) and failure to 
pay taxes (12%).  Finally, for bankruptcy, it was overextension of credit (22%); seasonal 
employment/insufficient income (15%); job loss (13%) and medical reasons (11%). 
 
The data indicate that overextension of credit is a primary cause of insolvency, with it being 20% 
to 24% the primary cause across all cohorts.  Home mortgage liability is significant for the 
Division I proposal debtors, but less significant for bankrupts, many of whom do not have equity in 
homes.   
 
Credit card debt is a serious problem across all groups, and is growing, as observed by Ronald 
Mann and other scholars.  Canada would benefit from longitudinal data in respect of credit card or 
other debt.  Qualitative data in respect of credit card debt within this study made some reference 
to use of credit cards for payment of groceries and utilities, in addition to more general consumer 
spending, particularly in the period leading up to filing insolvency proceedings.  These data 
confirm an earlier study that found that credit card debt was being used by older consumer 
debtors to buy necessities.68  Given that credit card debt is high interest debt and not subject to 
specific payment schedules, credit card debt can more easily accumulate and then pose 
significant problems for low income debtors.  Yet, to date, insolvency policy does not really factor 
the nature of this debt into policy development. 
 
Job loss and seasonal employment together are a significant cause of insolvency across Division 
II consumer proposal debtors (26%), Division II business proposal debtors (33%), and bankrupts 
(28%), but less so for Division I proposal debtors (16%). These data suggest that there are 
broader economic and social challenges that need to be addressed, as financial distress is often 
beyond the control of the individual debtor.  To date, there is little linkage in Canada between 
economic stimulus and employment policy development and insolvency law policy development. 
Without longitudinal data over an extended period, it is difficult to know whether the problem of 
insufficient employment opportunities is a growing phenomenon, data that would be helpful to 
collect in the future. 
 
Money mismanagement as the primary cause of insolvency figures prominently in Division II 
consumer proposal debtors (25%), and is relatively important in Division II business proposals 
(15%) and Division 1 proposals (14%); but is less so in bankruptcy (9%).  It makes sense that 
those debtors who could better manage financially may end up in proposal proceedings, because 
they have assets to protect and a proposal may allow them to become financially viable if they 
can acquire the skills and information to live within their financial capacity.  Current mandatory 
counselling that focuses on the money management aspects of consumer insolvency may assist, 
although there has been little empirical study to date on the effectiveness of mandatory credit 
counselling.  However, there is some question as to the value of these programs where poor 
money management is less of an issue than lack of reasonable levels of employment income or 
lack of jobs. These programs need future assessment in terms of whether they expend resources 
in the most appropriate direction.  
 
Failed business was most significant for Division I proposal debtors (16%).  However, the reasons 
underlying the failure of the businesses in the cohort were not sufficiently disclosed to make 
meaningful observations. Future research should be conducted into what aspects of the business 
failed, as there is considerable difference between larger market failures, sector downturns, and 
mismanagement or poor governance practices within a small business. 
 
Medical reasons are a significant cause for Division II business proposal debtors (15%) and 
bankruptcy (11%), compared with the other cohorts, Division II consumer proposal debtors (8%) 
and Division I proposal debtors (6%). However, as noted earlier, it is uncertain whether medical 
bills and lack of coverage, or medical problems resulting in inability to earn sufficient income are 
the real source of the financial distress. Equally, medical debt may be masked if consumer 
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debtors have paid for medical bills by credit card on exit from hospital or particular outpatient 
services, as is the normal practice in some regions.  Direct survey and interview data would assist 
in acquiring a clearer picture of this cause of insolvency. 
 
 
 
2.  Does home ownership influence the decision regarding choice of proceeding? 
 
The OSB offers the following summary data on home ownership, indicating that overall, 
bankrupts have fewer houses than other categories of consumer debtors:69 
 
 
Table 13 
Percentage Estates with Houses by Type 
 
Total 
Estates 
Estates with 
Houses Percentage 
Bankruptcy 993 201 20.24% 
Division I 731 345 47.20% 
Division II Business 1085 604 55.67% 
Division II Consumer 4453 1344 30.20% 
Total 7262 2494 34.34% 
 
 
From the data in this study, it appears that home ownership is one predictor of proposal filing, but 
only where there is equity to preserve in the home.   
 
The data indicate that mortgage debt as a percentage of total liabilities is high in Division II 
proposals in particular, less so for Division I and even less for bankruptcies.  Mortgage debt was 
53% of total liabilities for Division II consumer proposals, with 32% of all debtors in this cohort 
holding mortgage debt.   Mortgage debt was 61% of total liabilities for Division II business 
proposals, with 56% of all debtors in this cohort holding mortgage debt.   Mortgage debt was 28% 
of total liabilities for Division I proposals, with 40% of all debtors in this cohort holding mortgage 
debt.   In contrast, mortgage debt was only 22% of total liabilities for bankruptcies studied, with 
17% of all debtors in this cohort holding mortgage debt.    Mortgage debt is thus not as significant 
in bankruptcy, as compared with Division II proposals or Division I proposals.  
 
These figures indicate that fewer bankrupts have houses, compared with proposal debtors.  One 
can examine the mean and median amount of house assets against the mean and medium 
amount of mortgage debt as an indicator of equity that debtors are trying to protect. Although not 
a straight calculation, it is a rough measure of equity across the cohort. 
 
Amount owed under mortgage 
             Mean   Median 
Division II consumer   $ 144,692  $ 137,137  
Division II business    $ 144,890  $ 137,000 
Division I  $ 176,790  $ 150,952  
Bankruptcy  $ 126,700  $ 105,430 
 
 
House asset value 
             Mean    Median 
Division II consumer   $ 164,141  $ 152,500  
                                                 
69
 Source, Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, December 20, 2007. 
 38 
Division II business    $ 155,679  $ 150,000 
Division I  $ 212,107  $ 186,930  
Bankruptcy  $ 118,834  $ 105,000 
 
 
Comparing figures across data sets, it is clear that for both mean and median, the amount of 
mortgage debt for consumer bankrupts is greater than the value of the assets, meaning that the 
bankrupts were in possession of homes, although lower value than other categories, but they did 
not have equity in the home to protect.  The negative equity can be a function of dropping house 
prices and/or further borrowing on the mortgage in the period prior to financial distress.  These 
data are drawn from the period before the sub-prime mortgage crisis in the US. 
 
In contrast, there is considerable house equity across all categories of proposals, suggesting that 
protection of home equity, the most valuable asset in all proposal categories, is a major influence 
on choice of proceeding.  For Division II consumer proposal debtors, the median equity was over 
15,000 CAD; for Division II business proposal debtors, the median equity was 13,000 CAD; and 
for Division I proposal debtors, it was 36,000 CAD.  Hence, protection of house assets appears to 
be a significant influence on choice of proposal versus bankruptcy.   
 
Given that there are different exemption rates for homes across the country, a further research 
question is the extent to which regional exemption rates for primary residences influence choice 
of proceeding. This is an important issue that deserves further investigation as this study was not 
able to undertake a detailed analysis of this issue.70  However, on a summary basis alone, one 
can view the regional distribution of housing assets for the Division II and Division I consumer 
data sets, as summarized in Graphs 13 and 15 below.  
 
On simple overall totals, unadjusted for regional population totals, Graph 13 illustrates that the 
overall dollar amount of housing assets is far more significant in Ontario and Québec than other 
jurisdictions for Division II consumer debtors.  Graph 15 illustrates that the overall dollar amount 
of housing assets for Division I debtors is more evenly distributed across several provinces, 
although Ontario is still significantly higher than the other regions. Graphs 14 and 16 below 
illustrate that the mortgage debt follows the same regional pattern as housing assets for Division 
II and Division I consumer debtors.   
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Graph 14 Mortgage Debt by Province, Division II Consumer (unadjusted) 
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Graph 15 Housing Assets by Province, Division I (unadjusted) 
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Graph 16 Mortgage Debt by Province, Division I (unadjusted) 
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It is the value of the equity in housing, combined with the provincial exemption rate that may be a 
significant driver towards a particular insolvency process.  However, the data would have to be 
analyzed in the context of median and mean amounts and the amount of exemptions by province 
before meaningful conclusions could be drawn.  
 
The exemptions for equity in homes vary considerably in the provinces and territories in Canada, 
the amounts varying from no exemption to an exemption of $40,000 in Alberta. In October 2005, 
the Canadian Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Professionals, in its submission to the 
government on legislative reform, highlighted the wide discrepancies in exemptions for equity in 
homes, observing that for Ontario, Québec, New Brunswick, PEI and Nova Scotia, there is no 
exemption at all.71  In the Yukon, NWT and Nunavut, the exemption is $3,000; and in 
Newfoundland and Labrador, it is $10,000. For British Columbia, the exemption is $12,000 in the 
Capital Regional District or Greater Vancouver Regional District and $9,000 for the rest of the 
province. In Saskatchewan, the exemption is $32,000; and in Alberta the exemption is $40,000. 
In Manitoba, it is the residence or home, not held in joint tenancy or tenancy in common, of any 
debtor other than a farmer, where the value does not exceed $2,500, or where held in joint 
tenancy or tenancy in common, the value of interest of the debtor does not exceed $1,500.72 
 
If one considers these regional differences in the context of the above graphs, it is evident that in 
jurisdictions where there is no exemption for equity, a significant factor in opting for a proposal 
may be the equity in the home.  In Ontario, for example, the graphs indicate that there is 
considerable equity in homes of both Division I and Division II consumer debtors.   
 
Graphs 17 and 18 below, providing data on the value of housing assets and mortgage debt for 
bankrupt consumers illustrates that in jurisdictions where there is no exemption, the bankrupt may 
not have much, if any, equity to protect, whereas in jurisdictions with exemptions, it appears that 
bankruptcy may be an option, where the bankrupt able to protect some equity in the home.73 
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 Canadian Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Professionals, Submission on Proposed Personal 
Insolvency Amendments under Bill C-55 to the House of Commons Standing Committee on  
Industry, Natural Resources, Science and Technology, October 21, 2005, 
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Graph 17 Housing Assets by Province, Consumer Bankruptcy (unadjusted) 
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Graph 18 Mortgage Debt by Province, Consumer Bankruptcy (unadjusted) 
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It also merits note that in addition to houses, ownership of land, cottages and motor vehicles are 
also significant assets that debtors are seeking to protect by opting for a proposal proceeding, as 
indicated by Tables 2, 4, and 6 above, although, the amount of equity in those assets is difficult to 
determine from the data as collected by the OSB.  Motor vehicles are exempted in a number of 
provinces, to a specified amount, either explicitly or as a tool of trade where they are needed in 
the employment of the bankrupt. 
 
 
3.   Is credit card debt a factor in consumer insolvency in Canada? 
 
The data indicate that credit card debt is a significant factor in consumer insolvency; however, 
other than the dollar amount of such debt in Division I proposals, there is not really a distinction in 
the amount of credit card debt between Division II proposal debtors and bankrupts, as illustrated 
by the summary below.  Credit card debt as a percentage of total liabilities is relatively consistent 
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across data sets, between 14% and 18% of all liabilities.  Credit card debt as percentage of total 
liabilities was 18% for Division II consumer proposal debtors; 15% for Division II individual 
business debtors;  14% for Division I consumer debtors and 17% for consumer bankrupts. 
 
Similarly, the mean and median amount of credit card debt, while a significant amount of debt in 
terms of cause of insolvency, does not vary greatly as between bankrupts and Division II proposal 
debtors.  In contrast, Division I proposal debtors have more than double the mean and median 
amount of credit card debt. 
 
Amount owed under bank-issued credit cards 
          Mean   Median 
Division II consumer $ 12,419  $  9,045 
Division II business  $ 14,090  $  9,911 
Division I  $ 33,660  $22,762  
Bankruptcy  $ 14,916  $  8,353 
 
 
There is also significant credit card debt from non-bank credit cards, such as those offered by 
retailers, which has also contributed to the financial distress of these debtors: 
 
 
Amount owed under non-bank issued credit cards 
          Mean  Median 
Division II consumer $ 7,222  $  4,884 
Division II business  $ 9,179  $  5,843 
Division I  $ 15,969 $  8,387  
Bankruptcy  $ 8,385  $  4,502 
 
 
When taken together with bank-issued credit cards, there is some indication that debtors have 
multiple credit cards and incur substantial liability on those cards before filing insolvency 
proceedings.  However, as between bankruptcy and Division II proposals, the median amount of 
debt does not seem to be a factor driving choice of proceeding as the amounts are similar. 
 
Credit card debt carries high interest rates. Moreover, neither incurring the debt nor paying it is 
subject to rigorous parameters that assist debtors in managing their finances.  For example, a 
mortgage payment or payment on a movable such as an appliance are debts for a fixed amount, 
payable at lower interest rates over a fixed period of time.  Failure to make the specified 
payments each month or other specified period results in default of the loan, and can give rise to 
rapid enforcement action.  In contrast, credit card debt can quickly escalate, is owed at much 
higher interest rates that can rapidly compound financial distress, and the lack of a defined 
payment plan, other than a minimum payment, means that consumer debtors are not encouraged 
to pay these debts first, leading to longer term financial distress.  A future area of research would 
be to determine the extent to which these differences in type of debt and repayment terms are a 
contributing factor to consumer financial distress, the capacity to manage debt, and the potential 
for economic rehabilitation of individual debtors. 
 
 
4.   Are bank loans a factor in consumer insolvency in Canada? 
 
Here again, it is clear that bank loans, other than mortgages on real property, are a significant 
source of debt.  While the amount of bank loan debt varies across cohorts, as a percentage of 
total liabilities, there is consistency across all groups. Similarly, the total number of debtors that 
have bank loans, excluding mortgages on real property, is fairly consistent across all cohorts.   
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For Division II consumer proposal debtors, bank loans comprised 13% of total liabilities and 67% 
of all these debtors had bank loans; for Division II business proposal debtors, bank loans 
comprised 12% of total liabilities and 73% of all these debtors had bank loans;  for Division I 
proposal debtors, bank loans comprised 14% of total liabilities and 71% of all these debtors had 
bank loans; and for bankrupts, bank loans comprised 15% of total liabilities and 61% of all these 
debtors had bank loans 
 
However, the amount of bank loan debt varies across cohort, as indicated below: 
 
Amount owed under bank loans (excluding mortgages) 
          Mean  Median 
Division II consumer   $ 16,605  $ 13,218  
Division II business    $ 22,263  $ 18,192 
Division I  $ 51,361  $ 35,467  
Bankruptcy  $ 23,478  $ 14,137 
 
 
Hence, Division I proposal debtors had more than double the mean and median amount of bank 
loans.  Bankrupts had just under 1,000 CAD more median bank loans than Division II consumers 
and less than Division II business proposal debtors.  While bank loans are a contributing cause of 
insolvency, there is no evidence in this study to suggest that they influence choice of proceeding. 
 
As noted above, some trustees have attributed the high amount of unsecured bank loan debt to 
the introduction of on-line credit applications and approvals, increasing the ease with which 
debtors acquire such loans. This amount represents the greatest amount of median debt after 
mortgage debt, but about the same median as credit card debt owed when credit card debt of all 
types are tallied. The data did not indicate whether the bank loans pre-date credit card debt, 
coincide with acquisition of credit card debt, or were taken out as consolidating loans once credit 
card debt became unmanageable. Further study of this issue would be helpful to discerning how 
particular combinations of debt arrangements lead to financial distress. 
 
Another issue that the data set identified for further research was the intersection between type of 
debt, for example bank loan or credit card debt, and age.  The facility with which debtors can 
acquire particular kinds of debt may be a significant contributing factor; however, the information 
provided for this study did not offer these data. 
 
 
5.   Are finance company loans a factor in consumer insolvency in Canada? 
 
Finance company loans comprise a smaller percentage of total liabilities than credit card debt or 
bank loans across all cohorts, 6% of total liabilities for Division II consumer, Division II business 
and Division I proposals and 7% for bankrupts. However, a significant number of debtors hold 
such loans:  44% of all Division II consumer debtors; 57% of all Division II business debtors; 43% 
of all Division I debtors; and 45% of all bankrupts.  The mean and medium for all groups are set 
out below: 
 
Amount owed under finance company loans 
          Mean  Median 
Division II consumer   $ 11,380  $   9,000  
Division II business    $ 13,231  $ 10,000  
Division I  $ 36,965  $ 16,000  
Bankruptcy  $ 14,723  $   9,000 
 
Division I debtors again have significantly higher mean and median amounts owing under finance 
company loans.  There are more consistent amounts across the three other cohorts, particularly 
the median amount. 
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Trustees have reported that finance company loans are often consolidating loans whereby 
debtors get credit card debt consolidated, and that this effort to control debt is frequently 
undertaken when consumer debtors experience financial distress, but often well before any 
insolvency filing.  Hence, some portion of these amounts may reflect old credit card debt. 
 
The OSB advises that this category also captures a number of pay day loans, although several 
other categories catch pay day loans as well.  While the introduction of payday loans has raised a 
number of issues in consumer insolvencies, particularly in respect of service and interest 
charges, and a potential cycle of increasing debt through multiple rollover loans, the OSB data on 
sources of debt does not precisely capture pay day loans as they are scattered across several 
categories of OSB data, including finance company debt.74 Such loans require further study, 
particularly in respect of the extent to which they contribute to consumer insolvency. As noted 
earlier, one study has found that 25% of insolvent consumer debtors owed more than 25% of 
their monthly income to payday lenders.75  Only after there is a clearer empirical picture of the 
alternative financing market will there be data on which to consider reform of the consumer 
lending system. 
 
 
6.      Are there differences in the amount of tax owing between proposal debtors and 
bankrupts? 
 
Tax liability is not a critical cause of filing for Division II proposal debtors.  While 31% of all 
Division II consumer proposal debtors and 40% of all Division II business proposal debtors had 
some tax debt on filing, it comprised only 2% and 1% respectively of total liabilities.  For 
bankrupts, 37% of bankrupts had outstanding tax debt on filing, comprising 8% of their total 
liabilities.   
 
In contrast, for Division I debtors, almost one half, 48% had outstanding tax liabilities, amounting 
to 17% of their total liabilities, representing a significant amount of their debt.  The median 
amount of tax debt for Division I proposal debtors was ten times that of the other cohorts: 
 
 
Amount owed for outstanding taxes 
          Mean  Median 
Division II consumer   $   6,181  $   2,000 
Division II business    $   4,428  $   1,964 
Division I  $ 91,627  $ 30,300  
Bankruptcy  $ 22,334  $   3,204 
 
 
Hence, median amounts owed for tax liabilities at the time of filing were modest for Division II 
proposals and bankruptcy, but significant for Division I proposals.   
 
The government enacted legislative reform to address issues arising from what it viewed as high 
tax debtors using bankruptcy proceedings to avoid debt tax.  Section 172.1 of the BIA introduced 
a new procedure in 2008 for discharging bankrupts with high personal income tax debt. It is 
aimed at those individuals who have an outstanding personal income tax debt (federal and/or 
provincial) in excess of $200,000, including principal, interest and penalties, where the amount 
owing represents 75% or more of the bankrupt’s total unsecured proven claims. The new section 
was designed to ensure that bankrupts with significant personal income tax debt do not misuse 
the insolvency system by paying their other creditors to the exclusion of the government. These 
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 Ibid. 
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bankrupts will not be eligible for an automatic discharge and an application for discharge will be 
required. The onus will be on the debtor to justify any relief to be granted by the court.  The 
legislation sets out the timing of bankruptcy relief and the types of orders that the court may make 
on the hearing of a bankrupt’s application for discharge. The options available to the court 
include: refusing the discharge; suspending the discharge; requiring the bankrupt to perform any 
acts, pay any moneys, consent to any judgements or comply with any other terms that the court 
may direct. There are new statutory provisions setting out the factors the court shall take into 
account when making a decision with respect to the bankrupt’s discharge, including: the 
bankrupt’s circumstances at the time the personal income tax debt was incurred; the efforts made 
by the bankrupt to pay the personal income tax; whether the bankrupt paid other debts while 
failing to make reasonable efforts to pay the personal income tax debt; and the bankrupt’s 
financial prospects for the future.76 The onus is on the bankrupt to justify the relief requested of 
the court. The court has authority to modify the order if the bankrupt satisfies the court that there 
is no reasonable probability that he or she will be in a position to comply with the terms of the 
order.   
 
Interestingly, the 5,773 cohort in this study did not identify bankrupts as having tax debt of an 
amount that would bring them within these new provisions; rather, the mean and median were 
higher for Division I proposal debtors than bankrupts.  These new provisions, therefore, may be 
aimed at a very small segment of the bankrupt population. 
 
 
7.   Are student loans a factor in consumer insolvency in Canada? 
 
Overall, student loans are not a significant factor in either proposals or bankruptcies, as indicated 
by the figures below.  This insignificance was likely due to the fact that student loans were not 
discharged in bankruptcy for ten years and hence there is no incentive on creditors to 
compromise these loans in a proposal.  However, the median amounts owed were between 7,000 
CAD and 11,300 CAD at the time of filing, suggesting that while not a primary cause of 
insolvency, the outstanding amounts of these loans were a contributing factor to the financial 
distress. 
 
The importance of this type of liability may or may not change with the softening of the length of 
period from ten to seven years and the hardship exemption to five year. Section 178(1)(g) of the 
BIA was amended effective July 7, 2008 to reduce the waiting period from ten years to seven 
years and section 178(1.1) was amended to reduce the waiting period before a hardship 
application could be made from ten years to five years.  Ten years was generally thought to be 
too long a period before former students could apply for relief from the provisions. Even with 
these amendments, there will be a considerable period of time before student loans can be 
forgiven in the fresh-start programs. 
 
 
Student loans as percentage of total liabilities 
 
Division II consumer  1%     (31% of all debtors) 
Division II business    0.7%    (8% of all debtors) 
Division I   0.6%    (8% of all debtors) 
Bankruptcy   1.4%    (13% of all debtors) 
 
Amount owed under student loans 
          Mean Median 
Division II consumer $ 11,374 $   7,547  
Division II business    $ 10,396 $   7,367  
Division I   $ 20,405 $ 11,383  
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Bankruptcy   $ 11,039 $   8,500 
 
 
 
8.  What impact does the different timing period for rehabilitating one’s credit rating have 
on the decision to make a proposal or not? 
 
The data sets in this project did not offer any indication one way or another as to the answer to 
this question.  However, in the interviews with trustees, it seemed apparent that all other factors 
being equal, the timeliness of bankruptcy discharge, particularly for first time bankrupts, was a 
factor in the choice of proceeding.  The availability of discharge and fresh start in credit rating 
rehabilitation at nine months, compared with a payment period of three to five years, during which 
time a debtor’s credit rating does not begin to rehabilitate, does influence choice of proceeding.  
This choice based on timing period does not bear out where there are non-exempt assets to 
protect, which was a principal reason for opting for a proposal. 
 
The other timing issue that was identified, but the study was not able to explore, was an issue in 
respect of timing of filing an insolvency proceeding. One possible explanation for the growth in 
credit card debt and other loans is that individual debtors are waiting for longer periods before 
accessing the formal insolvency system.  Only a broad based national longitudinal study would be 
able to discern whether or not this lag is a broad based phenomenon.  Interestingly, there has 
been considerable scholarship on the problems of deferred liquidation for business insolvency, 
but little, if any, research on how deferred filing may harm consumer debtors through further 
erosion of their assets and deepening debt before they access the rehabilitation provisions of the 
BIA. Since this information was anecdotal, further research, through direct survey of consumer 
debtors, would shed greater light on this question.  
 
 
9.  Are there sociological reasons why consumer debtors may opt for proposals rather 
than bankruptcy, in terms of continuing stigma associated with bankruptcy? 
 
It is evident, again from the trustee interviews, that proposals are viewed with less social stigma 
than bankruptcy, particularly in smaller communities.  Here again, the need for further research, 
directly with consumer debtors, would assist in understanding choice of proceeding. There is 
evidence in US studies to suggest that individuals continue to hide the circumstances of their 
financial distress and that they believe there is considerable negative sentiment against debtors 
that seek recourse to bankruptcy procedures.77  The study of elderly bankrupts in Canada found 
similar evidence that there continues to be considerable stigma associated with making an 
assignment in bankruptcy.78 
 
 
10.   Will current proposed amendments encourage more debtors to undertake proposals? 
 
Many of the proposal provisions have remained intact with the proposed legislative reform. 
However, there are two significant amendments that should encourage more successful 
proposals. 
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 Deborah Thorne and Leon Anderson, “Managing the Stigma of Personal Bankruptcy” (2006) 39 Soc. 
Focus 77 at 80-97. 
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 Sarra, supra, note 7. Another research question was whether enhanced counselling at the commencement 
of the process had an impact on choice of insolvency proceeding. The data available for this study was not 
able to answer this research question.  The anecdotal information from trustees was varied and did not point 
in any particular direction.  An area of future research would be to conduct some survey and other study to 
discern the impact of counselling. 
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First, the proposed amendment to the definition of “consumer debtor” will increase the amount of 
debts that an individual may have to be eligible to make a Division II consumer proposal from 
$75,000 to $250,000.  The previous indebtedness ceiling of $75,000 was likely too low and forced 
many self-employed individuals and higher-income debtors to make a more costly and more 
complicated Division I proposal, in turn, reducing recovery for creditors. In addition, failure of a 
Division I proposal results in an automatic bankruptcy, whereas failure of a consumer proposal 
does not. The increase in the indebtedness ceiling was aimed at making the simpler and more 
cost-effective consumer proposal scheme available to a greater number of people and thus 
should encourage more proposals. 
 
The proposed amendments should also assist with the failure rate of proposals. As discussed 
above, the second greatest number of proposals fail when they are deemed annulled after some 
period of making payments under the proposal. 
 
Under the new amendments, there is a new procedure to be able to revive a deemed annulled 
proposal.  Section 66.31 sets out the rules by which a deemed annulled consumer proposal can 
be revived. The provisions provide the administrator with the discretion to revive a consumer 
proposal that has been deemed annulled under subsection 66.31(1). Previously, there was no 
way to revive a consumer proposal that was in default. The new section allows an administrator 
to rectify the default by providing notice to the creditors. It assists in situations where the debtor 
faces a temporary problem meeting payments, for example, due to illness or temporary 
unemployment, but otherwise is making good faith efforts to comply with the terms of the 
proposal. Creditors have the opportunity to object to the revival. The creditors’ rights to the 
amount of their claims less any dividends received are revived between the day on which the 
proposal is deemed to be annulled and the day on which it is revived, a period of 45 days.  
 
Under ss. 66.31(6), in the case of a deemed annulment of a consumer proposal made by a 
person other than a bankrupt, if the administrator considers it appropriate to do so in the 
circumstances, it may, with notice to the official receiver, send to the creditors, within 30 days,79 , 
after the day on which the consumer proposal was deemed annulled, a notice informing them that 
the consumer proposal will be automatically revived 60 days after the day on which it was 
deemed to be annulled,80 unless a creditor with the administrator files a notice of objection to the 
revival. If no notice of objection is filed within the time period, the consumer proposal is 
automatically revived on the expiry of that period.81  Under s. 66.31(8), if a notice of objection is 
filed, the administrator is to send, without delay, to the official receiver and to each creditor a 
notice informing them that the consumer proposal is not going to be automatically revived on the 
expiry of that period. 
 
Pursuant to s. 66.31(9), the administrator may at any time apply to the court, with notice to the 
official receiver and the creditors, for an order reviving any consumer proposal of a consumer 
debtor who is not a bankrupt that was deemed to be annulled, and the court, if it considers it 
appropriate to do so in the circumstances, may make an order reviving the consumer proposal, 
on any terms that the court considers appropriate.  
 
The revival provisions should make a significant improvement in the current failure rate of 
proposals, as it allows the administrator, and in some instances the court, to relieve against 
unforeseen obstacles that temporarily hindered the debtor’s ability to meet the conditions of the 
proposal. 
 
However, the above discussion assumes that individual debtors have the income to undertake a 
proposal and payments to creditors.  The reforms do not address a significant underlying cause 
of insolvency, specifically, inadequate income, job loss and lack of skills training for opportunities 
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in the changing economic landscape.  While these issues are broader public policy issues, it is 
important to take note of the limitations of insolvency law to address some of the most 
fundamental problems facing individual debtors. 
 
 
X. Conclusion 
 
The data analysed in this study have both shed some light on consumer insolvency proceedings 
and raised further questions for research, as discussed throughout this paper.  Canada has been 
undergoing insolvency reform for almost five years.  Included in the proposed reforms are 
amendments to consumer insolvency legislation, aimed in part in encouraging a greater number 
of proposals.  This research project supports the continuing reform process in trying to measure 
some of the factors that currently contribute to consumer insolvency and choice of relief.  It can 
be used as a baseline for future study, once the amendments are fully proclaimed in force.   
 
The study has identified some data points that should be better collected, which could enhance 
the ability to discern trends, including measurement of income to debt as another indicator of 
financial distress; data on how long individuals struggle under their debt load before they access 
remedies under the BIA and whether that length of time contributes somehow to a deepening 
financial distress that is then more difficult to recover from.  Most important, is the need for broad 
based multidisciplinary longitudinal studies that can measure the impact of policy choices over 
time and create a fuller picture of the obstacles facing consumer debtors.  Only then will public 
policy be truly responsive to the needs of both consumer debtors and their creditors.  
 
 
